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WHERE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPACES
CONVERGE: DISCRIMINATORY MEDIA ACCESS
TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
Ilana Friedman*
"[W]ere it left to me to decide whether we should have a government
without newspapers or newspapers without government, I should not
hesitate for a moment to prefer the latter."
-Thomas Jefferson I
INTRODUCTION
Government and the media engage in a constant battle over the
accessibility of information. At present, as the War on Terror gives the
federal government more power to deflect the media's scrutiny for purposes
of national security, 2 the implications of this battle present timely and
important questions. The climate of fear in newsrooms today is stronger
than it has been in several decades. This fear arises from the pressure that
politicians exert on journalists to conform to the story that the government
wants to tell.3 In particular, the current Administration has employed a
tactic of selectively granting access to government information to media
actors who support Administration policies and ask questions that highlight
Administration successes while stonewalling actors who are more critical. 4
The Administration physically restricted access to information, for
example, by routinely excluding a New York Times reporter assigned to
cover Vice President Dick Cheney from the press plane during the 2004
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2004, Barnard College,
Columbia University. Thanks to Professor Tracy Higgins for all of her help and guidance,
and to Adam, to my parents, Aryeh and Reena Friedman, and to my siblings, Uri, Shira, and
Tamar Friedman, for all of their support and encouragement.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16. 1787), quoted in
Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 Stan. L. Rev.
927, 932 (1992).
2. See infra notes 5-8, 225-48 and accompanying text.
3. See Paul J. Gough, Emotional Rather Blasts "New Journalism Order,"
http://medialit.med.sc.edu/rather-criticism.htm (stating that this pressure has "taken its toll
on the news business").
4. See infra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
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presidential campaign. 5  Additionally, the Administration admitted to
prescreening reporters' questions at a press conference during the Iraq War,
permitting only scripted questions to be asked.6 Access to government
information is not only controlled by restricting the press; rather, it may
also be problematic when government selectively grants access based on a
reporter's content or viewpoint. In a highly publicized incident, a member
of the White House press corps, Jeff Gannon, received liberal access to the
White House while working on behalf of an organization owned by a
prominent Republican whose mission it was to promote a conservative
agenda. 7 The organization arguably did not even qualify as a media entity.8
These actions affect not what the media may communicate or publish,
but rather the information to which the media has access, and whether
media access to that information is dependent on adhering to a particular
point of view. The U.S. Supreme Court is often willing to apply the First
Amendment as preventing restraints on publication, but it is much more
hesitant to grant the press what it considers to be special privileges. 9
Therefore, predicting the outcome of a Supreme Court case on differential
treatment of the media in gaining access to government information is more
complicated than predicting the outcome of, for example, a prior restraint
case. 
10
The First Amendment structurally envisions a clash between the press
and the government. All of the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights place
limits on the government with respect to individual citizens, with the
exception of the Press Clause, which limits the government's ability to
"abridg[e] the freedom of... the press" specifically."I This makes the
press the only institution specifically mentioned, and arguably protected, by
the Bill of the Rights. 12 Perhaps this is because the press needs protection
5. See Gail Russell Chaddock, Bush Administration Blurs Media Boundary, The
Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 17, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com
/20 05 /0 2 17 /p0 1 sO 1-uspo.htmi.
6. Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and
Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 101, 120
(2004).
7. Chaddock, supra note 5; see also Eric Boehlert, Gannongate: It's Worse than You
Think, salon.com, Feb. 23, 2005, http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2005/02/23/
more-gannon/index .html (last visited June 21, 2006); Charlie Savage and Alan Wirzbicki,
White House-Friendly Reporter Under Scrutiny, Boston.com, Feb. 2, 2005,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/02/02/white-house-friendly-r
eporter -under-scrutiny/.
8. See Boehlert, supra note 7.
9. See Dyk, supra note 1, at 928. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court protects the
press from prior restraints and some defamation claims, government-imposed access
requirements, and certain taxation schemes. Id. at 928-29.
10. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
11. U.S. Const. amend. I.
12. See Amy Jordan, The Right of Access: Is There a Better Fit than the First
Amendment?, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1349, 1360-64 (2004), for a discussion of whether the Press
Clause of the First Amendment is a general subset of free speech or whether the press as an
industry has its own separate protection. Some argue that the purpose of the Press Clause is
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from the government in order to empower citizens against the
government. 13 In other words, it is not the press that is protected by the
First Amendment, but the citizens who use the press as a tool to inform
their citizenship.14
The emergence of more powerful government since World War II
necessitates a more effective press with greater access to information.
15
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, though it clearly delineates protections
for the press based on the First Amendment, "has yet to explicitly afford
special protections to the newsgathering process."' 6 Press advocates argue
that there are a number of reasons to grant such protection, including the
press's role as a surrogate for the public. 17 They contend that political
bodies and journalists have developed their own alternatives to a right of
access, but such alternatives are unreliable at the times of the greatest
danger - when government is abusing its power.
18
Though the Supreme Court severely limits any right of access, 19 it has
not considered whether differentiating between media organizations or
individual reporters based on the content of their reporting implicates
greater constitutional values than traditional access provisions. This issue is
highly salient at this moment in history, as a secretive administration and
thwarting executive officials tightly guard government information related
to critical contemporary issues. 20 The constitutional question is whether
such secretive and discriminating behavior is permissible, and what ought
to be the appropriate test to determine when discriminating between media
organizations on the basis of content violates the First Amendment.
Part I discusses the place of newsgathering in the American political
tradition and First Amendment doctrine, and considers the applicability of
to ensure that people can express their views in writing as well as speaking without forfeiting
their rights under the First Amendment. See id. at 1360. Others counter that the Press Clause
provides special protection for the press because of the press's unique role in educating the
public so that it may adequately and meaningfully participate in the democratic system. See
id. at 1361.
13. See id. at 1361-62 (stating that the press plays a crucial role as "the so-called Fourth
Estate," acting to "'expos[e] public mismanagement and keep[] power fragmented,
manageable, and accountable.' These arguments indicate that the purpose of the press clause
was to guard against prior restraints of the press and to place additional checks on
government power" (quoting Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers'
Constitution 213 (1988))).
14. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
15. See Dyk, supra note 1, at 929 ("Under such circumstances, press access must be
'protected so that [the press can] bare the secrets of government and inform the people."'
(quoting N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring))).
16. Id. at 928.
17. See id. at 935. The press, however, is a less disruptive and, at least arguably, a more
discretionary body than the general citizenry. See id. at 935.
18. See id. at 936-37 (giving as examples Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
exemptions that permit the government to withhold evidence of abuse or delay its release
and the fact that government officials are unlikely to expose themselves when they abuse
power).
19. See infra Part I.B.3.
20. See generally Chaddock, supra note 5.
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the equal protection doctrine in differential press access to government
information. Part I also considers the parallel development of the public
forum doctrine, as well as divergent lower court decisions about
discriminatory press access. Part II explores the arguments on both sides of
the debate, illustrated by the lower court cases, which highlight the
historical lack of a right to gather news on one side and the equal protection
and content-based First Amendment arguments on the other. Part III argues
that the best test is one that applies the public forum doctrine to the
discriminatory media access problem.
I. THE MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE CONTROVERSIAL RIGHT
TO NEWSGATHERING AND THE INCORPORATION OF A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION INTO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
This Part introduces the Press Clause and First Amendment doctrine on
media access to government information. It then considers various theories
proposed by academics in support of a right of access. Part L.A considers
the balance between political and constitutional protections of the press.
Part I.B discusses the relationship between traditional rights protected by
the First Amendment and the lack of a general right to access government
information. Parts I.C, I.D, and I.E discuss related areas of doctrine
implicated in a discussion of selective media access to government
information, including equal protection doctrine, in both the general and the
media context, and public forum doctrine. Part I.F discusses the way a time
of war impacts freedom of speech doctrine.
A. The Intended Balance Between Executive/Legislative Power and Press
Access to Government Information
The framers of the Constitution wanted an informed public. In addition
to the First Amendment, the Constitution frequently references other ways
in which the government must be forthcoming in providing information to
the people. 21 These references suggest that the Constitution assigns value
to an informed electorate and that the framers passed the First Amendment
with a "core purpose" of promoting the circulation of ideas and information
necessary for government by the people.22
On the other hand, the fact that the framers expressly conferred these
rights might also suggest that they intended any other affirmative rights of
access to "depend upon political decisions made by the people and their
21. See Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1168 (3d Cir. 1986). For
example, the Constitution requires Congress to provide a regular statement of accounts and
receipts to be published from time to time and presumably to be provided to the public. U.S.
Const. art. I, § 9. The Constitution also requires the President to give Congress information
on the state of the union from time to time. Id. art. II, § 3. Finally, Congress must publish a
journal of its proceedings. Id. art. I § 5; see also Jordan, supra note 12, at 1367 (stating that
many of these other provisions in the Constitution are explicit suggestions of a right of
access).
22. See Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1167.
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elected representatives" 23 rather than to be constitutionally protected. 24
Some of the framers, at least, found the available provisions inadequate and
believed that the Constitution guaranteed more rights than those expressly
conferred. For example, James Wilson argued that "the people have a right
to know what their agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in
the option of the legislature to conceal their proceedings. '25 Patrick Henry
agreed, stating that "[Congress] may carry on the most wicked and
pernicious of schemes under the dark veil of secrecy. The liberties of a
people never were, nor ever will be, secure, when the transactions of their
rulers may be concealed from them."'26
The actions of the framers, arguably, suggest that they never found
public, on-demand access necessary to the goal of an informed public.27
They themselves met behind closed doors to write the Constitution, and the
Houses of Congress followed suit.28 The actions of the executive branch
also directly conflicted with a principle of access for the general public. 29
The framers granted representatives the right to withhold from the public
"such Parts [of their Proceedings] as may in their Judgment require
Secrecy." 30 In writing the Constitution, the framers always recognized that,
where discussions concerned military operations or matters of great secrecy,
the people had no right of access if publication would be detrimental to the
public.3 1
B. Does the Media Have a Right to Gather News Under the First
Amendment?
Though the media has a clearly established right to publish or broadcast
information, the doctrine governing media access to government
information is more complex and less well established.
First Amendment doctrine is highly deferential to the right to speak or
publish once the media already possesses the information sought. Prior
23. Id.
24. See id. at 1168.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1169.
27. See id. at 1169.
28. See id. The Senate met in private until 1794; the House of Representatives, less
open to the public, met in private until after the War of 1812. Committee sessions in both
Houses remained closed until the 1970s. The Senate currently holds onto its records,
granting access to the public after twenty years for routine Senate records, and after fifty
years for sensitive records. See id. at 1169.
29. Id. at 1170. For example, President Jefferson refused to turn Aaron Burr's private
papers over to John Marshall, claiming a "private side" to the presidential office. See id. He
argued that the balance between the public's right to know and the executive's need for
secrecy should be struck by the executive. See id.
30. Id. at 1169.
31. See id.
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restraint is probably the quintessential First Amendment violation and one
of the primary reasons for its passage.32
The First Amendment secures "the paramount public interest in a free
flow of information to the people concerning public officials, '33 and the
First and Fourteenth Amendments also protect the right of the public to
receive published information and ideas. 34
This subsection discusses both the doctrine and the theory behind media
access to government information. Part I.A. 1 considers whether a right of
access is sufficiently important to examine in greater depth. Part I.A.2
articulates the barriers that make recognition of a right of access less likely.
Part I.A.3 examines the cases that make up the doctrine of media access to
government information, while Part I.A.4 evaluates their impact. Part I.A.5
goes beyond the doctrine to include theoretical support for media access to
government information.
1. The Political Process and a Free Press: Is a Right of Access Necessary?
Those who find a right of access necessary and important often rely on
arguments that the political process cannot adequately safeguard a free
press. Additionally, one may see the right as more or less necessary
depending on the role and status one envisions for the press.
Some critics argue that the political process is incapable of protecting
access, because "openness itself is essential to the proper functioning of that
process. Majoritarian pressure for openness cannot arise if people are
unaware of or misled about the abuses or mistakes going on behind closed
doors."'35 This question becomes even more urgent when considered in the
context of the War on Terror: "In the current political climate, where much
of United States foreign policy is quietly conducted at dangerous locations
around the world, the need for public information is vital for our democracy
to function correctly. '36
On the other hand, some argue that judicial doctrine finding no right to
access has not hurt the public, because representatives are generally
responsive to political pressure at the times that the public requires greater
access. 37  For example, there has been a profound change in the
government's approach to granting access in the last three decades, perhaps
32. See Karen C. Sinai, Shock and Awe: Does the First Amendment Protect a Media
Right ofAccess to Military Operations?, 22 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 179, 202 (2004).
33. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974) (internal quotations omitted).
34. See id.
35. Michael J. Hayes, Note, Whatever Happened to "the Right to Know"?: Access to
Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1111,
1138 (1987).
36. Matthew Silverman, National Security and the First Amendment: A Judicial Role in
Maximizing Public Access to Information, 78 Ind. L.J. 1101, 1101 (2003).
37. See Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1170 (3d Cir. 1986). But
see supra note 18 and accompanying text (arguing that the times when government is
abusing its power are the times at which it is least likely to grant access).
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as a result of the greater need for information arising from rapid
government growth. 38 The judiciary, however, has never "asserted the
institutional competence" to decide what access the public ought to receive
to government information. 39 Perhaps this is because the First Amendment
and the general grant of powers to the federal government by the
Constitution never explicitly mention access to information, so they provide
insufficient guidance to the courts. 40
There is a body of literature that generally extols the place of the media
in American politics. Some envision the press as the "Fourth Estate," a
fourth branch of government with a constitutional role superior to or at least
separate from that of the other three branches of government. 41 This is a
theoretical construct, promulgated fairly actively by academics, but never
confirmed in case law or even in dictum.42 The judiciary generally portrays
the media as a committed political force, always truthful and acting in good
faith, if not always fair and objective, a "force beyond commercial or
political self-interest and dedicated to serving the public good. ' 43 Lawyers
defending the press portray it as the archetypal critical citizen: aggressive,
politically involved, energetic, and vigorous in public service. 44 Lawyers
opposing the press characterize it as more hesitant, willing to demand extra
privileges, and expected to divulge sources. 45
Nevertheless, Professor Sandra Chance argues that, no matter what the
academic literature posits, the media today "face a backlash of
unprecedented proportions, new anti-media legislation, and a rise in court
decisions that chip away at traditional First Amendment protections for the
news media and threaten our very freedom. '46 The media face a crisis of
credibility today, accompanied by a decline in public support.47 In the
Freedom Forum State of the First Amendment Survey of Public Attitudes,
38. See Capital Cities Media, 797 F.2d at 1170-71. The Court noted that the federal
government had passed FOIA in 1967 and the Government in the Sunshine Act in 1976,
while state governments had passed similar, if not better, legislation. See id. (citing the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1984) (as amended) and the Government in the
Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976)).
39. Id. at 1171.
40. See id.
41. See Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse": The First Amendment Right of
Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 237, 247 (1995) (stating that academics
who advocated for a right to gather news used the argument that the First Amendment
conferred this role upon the press).
42. See id. at 247.
43. Jon Paul Dilts, The Press Clause and Press Behavior: Revisiting the Implications of
Citizenship, 7 Commc'n. L. & Pol'y 25, 32 (2002).
44. See id. at33.
45. See id.
46. Sandra F. Chance, The First Amendment in the New Millenium: How a Shifting





with data collected in 1999, more than half of the respondents reported that
they felt that the press has too much freedom.48
The public perception of the media is reflected in recent court decisions,
in which judges have cut back severely on protections, particularly limiting
the "breathing space" arguably necessary for the exercise of free
expression.49
Some academics argue that current doctrine is too permissive and does
not take into account actual media practices. 50 Therefore, they argue, the
rulings do not satisfy the underlying purpose of the First Amendment's
protection.51  Professor Philip Judy, for example, argues that First
Amendment jurisprudence permits the media to operate in a way that does
not contribute to the goal of an informed citizenry.5 2 He agrees with the
public assessment of the media and says that "taken as a whole, the Court
has all but encouraged bad journalism. The overall impact of the Court's
decisions has fostered a news media that need not adhere to standards of
accuracy or truth to be legally protected." 53
Therefore, although there is a perception of the media that would support
giving the media greater access as an agent of the public, others argue
against such a construction.
2. Barriers in the Way of Recognizing a Right of Access
There are several structural elements of the First Amendment that lead
both courts and scholars to believe that the Constitution does not
contemplate a right of access to government information. First, the
differences between the Speech Clause and the Press Clause are not always
clear. Also, one must consider the differences recognized between speech
and action in First Amendment doctrine.
One of the great debates in the question of media access is whether the
Press Clause provides the same or a qualitatively different protection than
the Speech Clause. According to former Chief Justice Warren Burger, the
difference between speech and the press does not matter, as the Press
Clause is "complementary to and a natural extension of' free speech.54 He
argued that it is only separate because the press is more likely to be
48. See id. at 170.
49. Id. at 170-71; see, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 12 F. Supp. 2d 931, 936-37 (E.D. Ark.
1998) (stating, in response to a request by the media for access to discovery materials in the
Paula Jones case, that the media was "often inaccurate" and, along with other entities,
motivated by the prospect of "profit and political gain"); Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp.
362, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (equating a media outlet with thieves after the government
permitted the media outlet's cameras to go into an apartment to film).
50. See Philip L. Judy, The First Amendment Watchdog Has a Flea Problem, 26 Cap. U.
L. Rev. 541, 542 (1997).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 548.
54. Dilts, supra note 43, at 27 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 800 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
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restrained. 55 Courts may be reluctant to define freedom of the press as
totally separate from freedom of speech, as the press is made up of
individual, unlicensed citizens. 56 The limits of the press are defined
partially by the fact that all citizens have a duty, to some extent, to act as the
press acts; therefore, because the press both represents and consists of
citizens, freedom of speech and freedom of the press essentially comprise
the same doctrine. 57
In contrast, Supreme Court doctrine sometimes recognizes the
fundamental role of the press in protecting First Amendment values, as
"function as much as forum." s58 The press, in this role, has a "watchdog"
function of sorts. 59 Such a conception might require greater constitutional
protection.
Regardless of whether one agrees that the Press Clause is a separate form
of protection, it is not clear whether the Press Clause protects the public or
the press as a private business. 60 Members of the media argue that the
Amendment was intended to give the press virtually an unrestricted license,
but the history surrounding the adoption of the First Amendment suggests
that the authors of the Constitution did not necessarily intend to give the
press special protection as a private business. 61  Justice Potter Stewart
believed that it was the business that was protected: "[T]he Free Press
Clause extends protection to an institution. The publishing business is, in
short, the only organized private business that is given explicit
constitutional protection." 62
Even if the press is granted special institutional privileges, a right of
access does not necessarily follow. There is a difference between denying
access to government information and restricting or punishing the process
55. See id. Note that one could quibble with this narrow understanding of the Press
Clause and argue that the separate articulation of freedom of the press ought to be treated
more like religion or expression, which are doctrinally separate from speech. See id.
56. See id. at 34.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 27. For example, the Supreme Court recognizes protection of the media
against government harassment and protection against discriminatory taxation. See id.
59. Id. Professor Dilts has written, "If the role of the press is to play the role of the
citizen critic, then the constitutional behavior of the press inevitably will be judged by a
judicial understanding of what it means to be a good citizen." Id. at 37.
60. See Jordan, supra note 12, at 1360-61.
61. See id. Note that it is not necessary to consider only what the founders were
thinking when they wrote the Constitution: "It is what they said, not necessarily what they
meant, that in the last analysis may be determinative. This is particularly true when
constitutional language is subjected to tensions not anticipated when the text was written."
Dilts, supra note 43, at 32 (citing Melville Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a
Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 Hastings L.J. 639, 641 (1975)).
62. Dilts, supra note 43, at 29 (quoting Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L.J.
631, 633 (1975)). However, Professor Randall Bezanson responds that it is not the business
that is protected but rather the exercise of "editorial judgment" of a particular kind. See id.
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of information-gathering. 63  The question is whether the process is
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.
According to C. Edwin Baker, both verbal and nonverbal conduct can
advance the purpose of the First Amendment. 64 Therefore, there seems to
be no reason to grant protection to speech and not conduct, especially
because freedom of assembly and freedom of religion both implicate
conduct rather than speech.65 The First Amendment, he argues, ought to
include all conduct that advances fundamental First Amendment values,
with the exception of obstructionist behavior and coercive or physically
injurious conduct.66 Professor Jon Paul Dilts would claim that access, more
conduct than speech, is integral to the purposes of the First Amendment:
Some scholars, unhappy with a dominant speech-action dichotomy
model of the First Amendment, complain that it forces recognition of
powerful protection for speech far from the core of First Amendment
values while ignoring actions essential to democratic ideals. They
complain that the assumption that the First Amendment protects
expression but not behavior has produced peculiar results, such as greater
constitutional protection for pornography than for press investigations of
organized crime. As a matter of social utility, they suggest, it would be a
more useful exercise of First Amendment freedoms to guard the activities
of a vigilant press than the speech of sexual panderers. 67
This dichotomy raises the question of how to treat the process by which the
media goes about acquiring news.
3. First Amendment Doctrine: Deference to the Media in the Context of
Newsgathering is Not Clearly Established
Though Supreme Court doctrine clearly dictates deference to the media
in speaking and publishing, 68 when faced with the question of whether the
Press Clause includes the right to access government information, the Court
has not given a clear answer. In Branzburg v. Hayes,69 the Court
reaffirmed the principle that journalists have no uninhibited right to publish,
63. See Jordan, supra note 12, at 1364-65. The author does concede that not allowing
access to government information interrupts the free flow of information. Id. at 1365.
64. See Dilts, supra note 43, at 26.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 28.
67. Id. at 25-26 (internal citation omitted).
68. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
69. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). This case was actually about whether journalists who were
asked to divulge their confidential sources to a grand jury might be forced to do so in spite of
the First Amendment. See generally id. The court stated,
It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening
of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of
general applicability. . . . [O]therwise valid laws serving substantial public
interests may be enforced against the press as against others, despite the possible
burden that may be imposed.
Id. at 682-83.
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but rather are subject to statutory and common law limitations. 70 The Court
stated that there is no constitutional right of special access to information. 7 1
The reporters in this case made the argument that being forced to disclose
news sources would hamper newsgathering because relationships between
reporters and reluctant sources would deteriorate. 72 The Court responded
that not every incidental burden on the press based on criminal and civil
statutes of general applicability is invalidated by the First Amendment, as
having rights under the Press Clause does not allow one to invade the rights
of others: 73
We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to
the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not
qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated. But...
[n]o exaction or tax for the privilege of publishing, and no penalty, civil
or criminal, related to the content of published material is at issue
here.... [R]eporters remain free to seek news from any source by means
within the law.74
The Court unequivocally stated that the right to speak and publish does
not imply an "unrestrained right to gather information," 75 though official
harassment of the press undertaken to disrupt a reporter's relationship with
his sources was not to be tolerated.76  Particularly because the press
continues to flourish despite a failure to recognize this right, the Court
concluded that maintaining the confidentiality of sources was not necessary
to the free flow of information.77
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court developed access doctrine that
continued to deny any right to gather news. Pell v. Procunier78 considered
whether prohibiting the press and other media members from interviewing
specific inmates, as codified in a Department of Corrections manual, was a
violation of the First Amendment. 79 The press argued that the limitation on
newsgathering impermissibly infringed on its rights under the Press
70. See id. at 684-85.
71. See id. The Court laid out a series of examples of forums that exclude newsmen,
including grand jury proceedings, Supreme Court conferences, crime scenes, some trials, and
meetings of private organizations. See id.
72. See id. at 670-71. The Court described the reporters' claim:
[T]o gather news it is often necessary to agree either not to identify the source of
information published or to publish only part of the facts revealed, or both;.., if
the reporter is nevertheless forced to reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the
source so identified and other confidential sources of other reporters will be
measurably deterred from furnishing publishable information, all to the detriment
of the free flow of information protected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 679-80.
73. See id. at 682-83.
74. Id. at 681-82.
75. Id. at 684.
76. See id. at 707-08.
77. See id. at 698.
78. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
79. See id. at 819.
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Clause, 80 citing a right of access to sources of newsworthy information.8'
The Court reiterated that the Press Clause had never been held to grant
reporters a special right of access exceeding that of the public. 82
Reaffirming its commitment to the freedom of the press, the Court stated
that the constitutional guarantee "assure[d] the maintenance of [the]
political system and an open society" and mandated a "free flow of
information." 83 The Court also stated, in dictum, that the First Amendment
protects the right of the public to receive information and ideas, 84 and that
any restraints are presumptively invalid under the Constitution. 85
Nevertheless,
[i]t is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of
information not available to members of the general public, that he is
entitled to some constitutional protection of the confidentiality of such
sources, and that government cannot restrain the publication of news
emanating from such sources. It is quite another thing to suggest that the
Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make
available to journalists sources of information not available to members of
the public generally.86
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.87 considered a similar issue: whether the
prohibition of individual or personal interviews between reporters and
individually designated federal prison inmates violated the First
Amendment. 88 The Court found that the burden on newsgathering was only
a variation of the burden on all individuals, press or not, to allow no one to
enter the prison and speak with whomever he or she would like. 89
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,90 established a similar principle based on
similar facts. The Court considered whether the media had a constitutional
right of access to a county jail to interview inmates.91 Distinguishing
80. See id. at 821.
81. See id. at 830.
82. See id. at 833. It is important to note, however, that the facts here suggested that the
press already enjoyed access beyond that which was granted to the public. See id. at 830-31.
Therefore, the regulation merely eliminated a privilege that news reporters had been granted
at one time. See id. at 831.
83. Id. at 832.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 834 (internal citations omitted).
87. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
88. See id. at 844. The regulation in this case prohibited both the general public and the
press from entering the prison to interview specific inmates without personal or professional
ties to the inmates themselves. See id. at 846. The news reporters, however, were still
granted considerable access to the prisons. See id. at 847. They were permitted to tour,
photograph, interview those they met during those tours, and correspond in an almost
unlimited fashion. See id. The lawyers for the federal prisons argued that these concessions
proved that the purpose of the regulation was "not part of any attempt.., to conceal from
the public the conditions prevailing in federal prisons." Id. at 848.
89. See id. at 849.
90. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
91. Seeid. at3.
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between the freedom afforded to the media to communicate information
already obtained and the constitutional compulsion to provide the media
with information or accede to media demands for access, the Court
reaffirmed the absence of a right of media access to prisons. 92 Articulating
the standard as clearly as it ever had, the Court stated that it had "never
intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of
information within government control. '93 The media, the Court asserted,
is not a part of government; sometimes the two complement one another,
and other times they conflict.94 The assumption that reporters are the best
qualified to discover institutional malfeasance finds no support in
constitutional doctrine, 95 even though the press serves a valuable function
in the democracy. 96  References to public entitlement to information
support a right to publish, not necessarily a right to access. 97 The Court
quoted Justice Stewart's opinion that "[t]he public's interest in knowing
about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the
protection is indirect. The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of
Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act."98 Nevertheless, the Court
reaffirmed the importance of the media to a democratic society.99
Finally, in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,100 the Court decided that the
press has no independent constitutional right to insist upon access to a
pretrial judicial proceeding.' 0 ' The State wanted to minimize adverse
prejudicial pretrial publicity. 10 2 History suggests that pretrial proceedings
had traditionally been closed under English common law, 103 though there
was a common law right of open civil and criminal trials.104 In Gannett, the
Court acknowledged a right of press access, but balanced that right against
the defendant's right to a fair trial and found that, because the denial of
92. See id. at 9.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 8-9.
95. See id. at 13-14. Nevertheless, the concurrence emphasized that the First
Amendment identified the press by name, thereby highlighting its special role in American
society, and that the Constitution therefore requires sensitivity to that role. See id. at 17
(Stewart, J., concurring).
96. See id. at 10.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 14 (quoting Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 636 (1975)).
99. See id at 10. The opinion defined "the role of the media 'as a powerful antidote to
any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for
keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected
to serve."' Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)).
100. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
101. Id. at 370-71.
102. See id. at 378.
103. See id. at 389-90.
104. See id. at 384.
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access was only temporary (the press would have access to the transcript
afterward), the defendant's rights outweighed the right of the press.10 5
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,10 6 the Court held for the first
time that the press had a right of access under the First Amendment. 107
The question was whether the press and the public had the right to attend a
criminal trial. 108 The media claimed a right to attend as a surrogate for the
public, because the media had certain amenities, including seating and
priority, allowing it to report. 10 9 Therefore, this right does not appear to fall
under the Press Clause alone, but rather under an amalgam of free speech,
free press, and freedom of association.110  The Court distinguished
Richmond Newspapers from Gannett, stating that Gannett did not decide
the question presented here because it involved a pretrial hearing and not a
trial.'1 ' Relying again on history, the Court made much of the fact that
throughout its evolution, the trial had always been open to those who
wanted access.1 12 Historically, there is a strong public policy rationale for
an open trial: An open trial ensures that people accept and support both the
process and the results of the administration of justice."l 3
Both concurring Justices in Richmond Newspapers would have decided
the case on slightly different grounds. Justice Stevens intimated that he
would be willing to recognize a right of access to information "about the
operation of [the] government, including the Judicial Branch" (but perhaps
suggesting not limited to it). 114 Justice Brennan concurred on broader
grounds, stating that, "[r]ead with care and in context, our decisions must
therefore be understood as holding only that any privilege of access to
governmental information is subject to a degree of restraint dictated by the
nature of the information and countervailing interests in security or
confidentiality."' 1 5 Nevertheless, he found that there must be some check
on this right, because a data flow to the public is far too broad of a right;
therefore, he proposed a consideration of the information sought and the
opposing interests invaded. 116 He adopted an explicitly political rationale,
105. See id. at 392-93. The concurrence, written by Justice Rehnquist, diverged from this
line of reasoning and stated that there was no First Amendment right of access. See id. at 404
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
106. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 558.
109. See id. at 573.
110. See id. at 577. All three have the same "common core purpose of assuring freedom
of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government." Id. at 575.
111. See id. at 563-64.
112. See id. at 564. For historical examples, in both England and the United States, see
id. at 564-69. In fact, based on all of these examples, the Court found that "part of the very
nature of a criminal trial was its openness to those who wished to attend." Id. at 568.
113. See id. at 571 ("A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and
where the trial has been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a
reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted.").
114. Id. at 584 (Stevens, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring).
116. See id. at 588.
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promoting self-sovereignty both beyond and independent of individual
freedom of speech. 117 To that end, he developed a two-part test that has
subsequently been used by courts considering the same issue: 1) Whether
there is an "enduring and vital tradition" of public access to the forum; and
2) "[W]hether access to a particular government process is important in
terms of that very process."'"18
Since the Richmond News decision, the Court has extended the right
articulated therein to rape trials, 119 voir dire examination of potential
jurors,120 and preliminary hearings, 12 1 among other judicial procedures and
documents. The lower courts have considered a number of similar cases,
and have extended the right of access to other legal proceedings, including
suppression hearings, bail hearings, change of venue hearings, plea
hearings, sentencing hearings, pretrial ex parte recusal proceedings, post-
conviction proceedings, parole revocation hearings, parole release hearings,
and executions.122 The right of access has also been extended to a number
of judicial documents associated with trials. 123 Generally speaking, courts
have been unwilling to extend protection of access to nonjudicial forums; 124
they have, however, found nonjudicial rights of access in judicial review
board proceedings, 125 federal administrative fact-finding proceedings, 26
state legislative meetings, 127 city council meetings, 128 and governor
executive travel records.' 29
117. See Cerruti, supra note 41, at 282.
118. Richmond News, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
119. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 598 (1982).
120. See Press Enter. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
121. Id. at 511-13.
122. See Cerruti, supra note 41, at 266-67.
123. See id. at 267-68.
124. See id. at 268. In one circuit court case, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
refused to extend the holding to a FOIA action against the Department of Justice to release
information concerning persons detained after September 11. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies
v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The journalists were requesting
information regarding names, attorneys, dates of arrest and release, locations of arrest and
detention, and reasons for detention. See id. at 920. The government based its refusal on
FOIA exemption 7(A), which exempts records compiled for law enforcement purposes from
discovery under FOIA. See id. The court focused on the fact that these were nonjudicial
documents and not part of a criminal trial, see id. at 934, and refused to "convert the First
Amendment right of access to criminal judicial proceedings into a requirement that the
government disclose information compiled during the exercise of a quintessential executive
power-the investigation and prevention of terrorism." Id. at 935.
125. First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 579 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.
Pa. 1984), vacated, 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986).
126. Soc'y of Prof'l Journalists v. Sec'y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569 (D. Utah 1985),
vacated, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987).
127. Adams v. League of Women Voters, 743 P.2d 333 (Alaska 1986).
128. WJW-TV, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 686 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1988), vacated,
870 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 819 (1989).




4. The Effect of Richmond News and its Progeny
In some ways, Richmond News was a watershed case.130 The case law in
the media right of access, however, is quite misleading. 131 The Court's
language sounds like it recognizes a broad right of access, but the holdings
are ultimately quite conservative. 132 The fact is that, "[d]espite a series of
assertions by the Supreme Court clearly suggesting tacit recognition of an
independent First Amendment right to gather information for purposes of
publication,"' 133 the Court has never recognized a right of press access
beyond the criminal court context. The Brennan test has not "traveled well"
in the doctrine: Though lower courts have held that a right of access is
appropriate in forums related to trial, they have seemed unwilling to extend
the holding to areas or documents outside of trial even with a strong history
of access or a great deal of utility to the governing process.134
Since Richmond News, the courts have decided a number of cases
involving discriminatory media access, but those decisions are by no means
uniform. 135
5. Academic Theories that Support a Right of Access to Gather News
Though courts have limited the right to access, scholars have
promulgated a number of theories that support a right of access to
newsgathering. Some of these theories also support a legal doctrine that
would prevent the government from differentiating between different media
organizations in granting access.
First Amendment theory and doctrine do not necessarily complement one
another. Newsgathering doctrine arguably moves away from the areas that
the First Amendment theoretically protects. 136  Access to government
sources is less protected than access to nongovemment sources, arguably
disserving the purpose of the First Amendment. 137 The doctrine is now
being used to protect academic and scientific research, as well as
information-gathering by private research and policy organizations, rather
than protecting the access rights of the media. 138 Perhaps the solution
130. See id. at 21-22 (stating that the language in Richmond News makes it clear that a
restraint on the flow of information does not comport with the First Amendment, and that the
press has a distinct role in a democratic society).
131. Cerruti, supra note 41, at 245.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 246.
134. See id. at 269.
135. See generally infra Part II.
136. See generally Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of
Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65
Ohio St. L.J. 249 (2004).
137. See generally id.
138. See generally id.
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would be a more cohesive doctrine that depends primarily on preserving the
"meaningful flows of information" that the First Amendment envisioned. 139
Professor Eric B. Easton suggests that the test for violations of the First
Amendment Press Clause ought to be an effectiveness test, though
admittedly this theory finds no support in doctrine. 40 Where the same
speech is available through other media, the theory posits, the First
Amendment may not allow it to be suppressed. 14 1 First Amendment
doctrine does not address this issue at all, and, "[c]onsequently, the
government has been permitted to take measures that suppress speech, by
some, but not other, speakers, to some, but not other, audiences."' 142
Easton proposes the initiation of a presumption against speech
suppression where the suppression would be futile in preventing
information from reaching the "marketplace of ideas."'14 3 The presumption
could be overcome only when the government asserts an important interest
unrelated to the content of the speech. 144 The test would apply to both
publishing and access, but it would be particularly important in the access
context, where it would "diminish the state's interest in suppression and
thus tip the scale in favor of access." 14 5 It is also true to the purposes of the
First Amendment, for "'[h]ow important can the government's asserted
interest in suppression be if it allows access to some arbitrarily chosen
members of the public or to the entire world via some other medium?' 146
139. Id. at 257.
140. See Eric B. Easton, Closing the Barn Door After the Genie Is Out of the Bag:
Recognizing a "Futility Principle" in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 DePaul L. Rev. 1,
3 (1995). Note, however, that this theory is already accepted doctrine in Great Britain and
Canada. See id. at 4-5. Additionally, several of the Justices in N.Y Times v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971), used this reasoning, though they did not identify it as such. See Easton,
supra, at 8. Justice Douglas, for example, stated, "'There are numerous sets of [the material
in question] in existence and they apparently are not under any controlled custody....
[T]here already is rather wide distribution of the material that is destined for publicity, not
secrecy."' Id. (quoting N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 723 (Douglas, J., concurring)). Similarly,
Justice White wrote in his concurring opinion that "'here, publication has already begun and
a substantial part of the threatened damage has already occurred."' Id. (quoting N.Y. Times,
403 U.S. at 733 (White, J., concurring)). Finally, Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion,
wrote, "'Whether the threatened harm to the national security or the Govermnent's
possessory interest in the documents justifies the issuance of an injunction against
publication in light of... [t]he extent to which the materials at issue have apparently already
been otherwise disseminated."' Id. (quoting N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. 713, 754-55 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). The Court also used effectiveness as one of three dispositive factors in Neb.
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (considering a case in which local media were
banned from publishing what the national media could publish), and considered it again in
United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (1979) (involving a decision by the
government to terminate its case after two other magazines published the information that
they were seeking to enjoin). For a discussion of these cases, see Easton, supra, at 8-10.
141. See Easton, supra note 140, at 3.
142. Id. at 3.
143. See id. at 64.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 36.
146. Id.
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There are three justifications for using the futility principle. The first is
that the government will conserve resources by not trying to "force the
genie back into the bottle" once the information is already available. 147 The
second is that it would increase respect for the law, because, as the way
things currently stand, authorities look foolish trying to suppress already-
available speech. 148 The third is that it would protect the integrity of speech
by increasing the number and diversity of information providers. 149
A related theory is that "genuine autonomy and the media's legitimacy
hinge not only upon its freedom to disseminate, but also on the duty to
exercise that right in a manner that incorporates the diversity of
individualized perspectives."' 150 If the purpose of a free media is to inform
the population and increase robust debate, then the best way to do that is to
have the media express a multiplicity of views. 151 Though it is arguable
whether the media changes attitudes, historical evidence suggests that the
media "acts subtly to influence public behavior."' 152
Other theorists argue that the right of access ought not to be considered
under the First Amendment but rather as a systemic right, such as the right
to vote. 153 The theory is that access serves more than just First Amendment
rights; instead, it is also a check on government, ensuring that government
does its job properly and enhancing the perception of fairness in
government activities. 154 Access also ensures individual participation in
government. 155 Under this theory, it is a more fundamental right than the
the rights secured by the First Amendment; it is, in fact, the ground on
which the First Amendment is built. 156
According to this theory, if one concedes that the right to vote is
fundamental, then the right of access to government information must also
be fundamental, because voting is meaningless unless the citizenry is
informed. 157  Democratic politics themselves then depend on access,
because in order for elected officials to take into account what the will of
147. Id. at 39.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Blake D. Morant, Democracy, Choice, and the Importance of Voice in
Contemporary Media, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 943, 944 (2004).
151. See id. at 945-46.
152. Id. at 949. Examples include Thomas Paine's role in starting the American
Revolution and William Randolph Hearst's part in galvanizing the public for the Spanish-
American War. See id. at 949-50. It is difficult to overlook, however, that the primary
motivator of the media is money, see id. at 951, which overshadows the libertarian ethic that
the media has a responsibility to the citizens to disseminate multiple viewpoints to the
marketplace. See id. at 952. Therefore, this theory requires that there be a corresponding
theory of democracy that encourages the expressive rights of others, which in turn will
enhance the level of participation in marketplace expression and will require the media to
report from various viewpoints. See id. at 962-63.
153. See Jordan, supra note 12, at 1349-5 1.
154. See id. at 1350.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 1369.
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the people is, the people must have a well-informed will. 158 This argument
is quite similar to the structural argument posited by Alexander Meiklejohn
and others, who argue both that the public right to receive information
serves the ends of self-government and that the affirmative right to have
government information provided facilitates public debate.159
Some theorists try to justify a right to access based on the public's "right
to receive information." This right is based on rationales that appear in a
number of cases. For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska160 the Court held that
there was a right to receive information in an educational context,
suggesting a symbiotic relationship between the right to know and the right
to speak. 161 More relevantly, in Near v. Minnesota,162 the Court found a
right to receive information in a case where a statute prohibited the press
from critiquing government officials. 163 Continuing with this line of
reasoning, the Court in Martin v. City of Struthers164 struck down a local
ordinance banning the distribution of handbills and advertisements,
reasoning that individuals had the right to receive information, and
therefore distributors had a right to distribute it. 165 The right to receive
information was most clearly stated in Lamont v. Postmaster General,166
where the Court held that requiring postal workers to separate and hold mail
containing communist propaganda material was unconstitutional. 167 The
concurrence specifically cited a right to receive publications in its
reasoning. 168
C. Equal Protection Doctrine and the Fundamental Right-Equal Protection
Confluence
Journalists who are excluded selectively from government information
often assert an equal protection claim as well as a First Amendment claim.
158. See id.
159. See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering
the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 95, 102 (2004)
(citing Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245,
256, 263); Jordan, supra note 12, at 1370-71.
160. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(holding that children may not be required to attend public school and may instead attend
any school of their choosing); Robin A. Arzon, Comment, Exploring Iraq War News
Coverage and a New Form of Censorship in Violation of the Quickly Evaporating Public
Interest Requirement and Public Right to Receive Information, 12 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J.
327, 336 (2005).
161. See Eric B. Easton, Public Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests and the
Right to Know, 21 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 139, 144 (2003).
162. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
163. See Arzon, supra note 160, at 336.
164. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
165. See Easton, supra note 161, at 145; Arzon, supra note 160, at 337.
166. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
167. Easton, supra note 161, at 146; Arzon, supra note 160, at 338.
168. See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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The courts will examine the classifications under rational basis review
unless given reason to do otherwise.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "No
state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."' 69  States, however, make classifications all the time;
therefore, "[i]n evaluating [a statute] under the Equal Protection Clause, 'we
must first determine what burden of justification the classification created
thereby must meet, by looking to the nature of the classification and the
individual interests affected."'" 70
When a fundamental right is at stake (e.g., the right to marry, or the right
to procreate), and where the classification significantly interferes with that
right, "critical examination" of state interests is required, and the remedy
must be found to be narrowly tailored to that interest. 171 Therefore, if the
right of access is found to be a fundamental right, classifying on that basis
would trigger heightened review.
D. Other Equal Treatment Cases in the Context of the Media
The Court has already decided cases involving the constitutionality of
distinguishing between media outlets in other contexts. In 1936, in
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 17 2 the Court held that a Louisiana statute
requiring publications with less than a certain weekly circulation to have
their advertisers pay a special tax was unconstitutional. 173 The Court
reasoned that the tax restrained publication in two ways: by restricting the
amount of revenue these publications could realize through advertising, and
by restricting circulation. 174 As a result, the statute was being used as a
device to limit the circulation of information to the public.' 75
Plaintiffs raised a similar question in Leathers v. Medlock,176 in which
cable television subscribers and other affected parties brought a claim
challenging an Arkansas sales tax applied to cable television on the theory
that the tax discriminated on the basis of the medium. 177 The Court
reaffirmed the holding in Grosjean, but found that the "discrimination"
described here was not sufficient to "stifle the exchange of ideas," and as
such did not violate the First Amendment under that holding. 178
169. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
170. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (quoting Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974)).
171. See id.
172. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
173. See Zrinka Rukavina, Re-Pressing the Internet: Journalists Battle for Equal Access,
13 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. & Pol'y 351, 355 (2003). The statute excluded only
seventeen of the 120 publications in the affected jurisdiction. See id. at 355.
174. See id. at 355.
175. Id.
176. 499 U.S. 439(1991).
177. See Rukavina, supra note 173, at 356.
178. See id.
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E. Parallel Doctrine: Public Forum Doctrine and Content-Based
Restrictions
This section considers the law on public forums, which distinguishes
between time, place, and manner restrictions and content-based restrictions
in general free speech doctrine. Some of the lower court cases have used a
similar rationale in finding that selective access to government information
is unconstitutional. 179
1. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
The Supreme Court held in Cox v. New Hampshire180 that a municipality
has a right to impose regulations to assure the safety and convenience of the
people without violating civil liberties, reasoning that "[c]ivil liberties, as
guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the
excesses of unrestrained abuses."'181 The state or municipality may regulate
the "time, place and manner in relation to the other proper uses of the
streets," so long as they do so without unfair discrimination. 182
The Court reaffirmed this holding in Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,183 in which a state regulation required all
those who wished to distribute or sell religious literature and solicit
donations to conduct their activities at fixed locations. 184 The Court held
that, pursuant to Cox, it is permissible to have restrictions that are subject to
time, place, and manner restrictions, but elaborated that these restrictions
are only permissible so long as they do not reference the content of the
speech, serve significant government interests, and leave open ample
channels for communication. 185  Additionally, the Court cautioned in
dictum that resting arbitrary power in a government official could lead to
inconsistent, and potentially content-based, results.1 86
2. Content-Based Restrictions
When legislation bases access to the public forum on the content of the
speech, however, the courts are not as permissive. In Schneider v. New
Jersey,187 the Court considered an ordinance that required those who
wished to distribute handbills on a public street to get their handbills pre-
179. See infra Part II.A.2.
180. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
181. Id. at 574.
182. Id. at 576.
183. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
184. See id. at 642.
185. See id. at 647-48.
186. See id. at 649.
187. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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approved by a government official. 188 The Court reasoned that so long as
legislation intends to keep the streets free for movement and travel and does
"not abridge the constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to
impart information through speech... it may lawfully regulate the conduct
of those using the streets." 189 The prohibited activity, however, must bear
"no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or distribute
information or opinion."' 190 As the Court suggested in Heffron, the
municipality was not constitutionally permitted to require those who wished
to disseminate ideas to present them first to police authorities for their
consideration or approval. 191 Recognizing the special place that the First
Amendment holds in American law, the Court stated: "Mere legislative
preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well
support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to
justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance
of democratic institutions." 192
In Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley,193 the statute at
issue defined disorderly conduct by limiting where and when the public was
permitted to picket, but excepted peaceful labor picketing from these
regulations. 194 The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because
it made "an impermissible distinction between labor picketing and other
peaceful picketing."'195 The central problem was the delineation of
permissible picketing by subject matter, 196 because "above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 197
"Necessarily... under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people
whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express
less favored or more controversial views."1 98 States may not, under this
holding, base their exclusions on content or justify their exclusions by
content.1 99 All restrictions must be "carefully scrutinized," though they
may pass muster if they are based on time, place, and manner restrictions,
conflicting demands for the same space, or protecting the public order.200
188. See id. at 154.
189. Id. at 160.
190. See id. at 161.
191. See id. at 164.
192. Id. at 161.
193. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
194. Id. at 92-93.
195. Id. at 94.
196. See id. at 95.
197. Id. (citations omitted).
198. Id. at 96.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 98-99.
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F. The Effect of the War on Terror
1. The History of Freedom of Speech in Wartime
Times of conflict always hit the First Amendment particularly hard:
"'Truth has been said to be the first casualty in war, but perhaps it is more
precise to say that the First Amendment has been the first casualty,
followed closely by the marketplace of ideas where truths, or at least better
understandings, are more likely to emerge than in a system of authoritarian
control. '"201
According to First Amendment scholar Vincent Blasi, "'[c]onstitutional
principles that are taken for granted in normal times may be challenged in
times of stress.' 20 2 Historically, in such times, everything
seem[s] so different, so out of joint, the threats from within or without
seem so unprecedented, that the Constitution itself is perceived by many
persons as anachronistic, or at least rigidly, unrealistically formalistic. In
times when those misgivings take hold, the central norms of the
constitutional regime are in jeopardy.20 3
Former Chief Justice William Rehnquist seems to adopt essentially the
position that President Abraham Lincoln took during the Civil War,
believing that "'the Constitution applies in time of war, but the special
demands of war may affect the application of the Constitution.' 20 4 Those
who advocate for decreased civil liberties in wartime assert that, for the
safety of democracy, there is no choice but to temporarily disable some
civil liberties during these turbulent times.20 5 American history bears out
that Americans have a long history of overreacting to the dangers of
wartime and suppressing dissent, later regretting their actions. 206
It has been argued that throughout American history, the national
government has never tried to suppress criticism of itself except during
times of war.20 7 Nevertheless, in nearly every war, the government placed
limitations on freedom of speech. The first important challenge to the First
Amendment was the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798,208 which was passed
201. Clay Calvert, Voyeur War? The First Amendment, Privacy & Images From the War
on Terrorism, 15 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 147, 147 (2004) (quoting Jeffrey
A. Smith, War and Press Freedom: The Problem of Prerogative Power, at vii (1999)).
202. See Kathleen K. Olson, Courtroom Access After 9/11: A Pathological Perspective, 7
Comm. L. & Pol'y 461, 462 (2002) (quoting Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective
and the First Amendment, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 449, 456-57 (1985)).
203. Id. at 462.
204. Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act
of 1798 to the War on Terrorism 543 (2004) (quoting William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws
But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime 2000).
205. See Karen L. Turner, Convergence of the First Amendment and the Withholding of
Information for the Security of the Nation: A Historical Perspective and the Effect of
September l1th on Constitutional Freedoms, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 593, 611 (2002).
206. See Stone, supra note 204, at 5.
207. See id.
208. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801).
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with the participation of many of the Constitution's drafters. 20 9 The Act
prohibited publication of "false, scandalous and malicious writing or
writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the
Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States. 210
The lower courts upheld the Act, but the Supreme Court never heard a case
under the statute. 211
The Espionage Act of 1917212 and the Sedition Act of 1918,213 passed
during World War I, had similar effects. The Espionage Act prohibited the
making of false reports or statements with the intent to interfere with
America's military success or aid its enemies, and attempting to cause
disloyalty or mutiny,214 while the Sedition Act prohibited, among other
things, "disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language intended to cause
contempt or scorn for the form of government of the United States, the
Constitution, or the flag ... or to utter any words supporting the cause of
any country at war with the United States." 215 Generally, during World
War I, the media was highly censored, broadcasting mostly pro-Allied news
coverage. 216
During the Vietnam War, there were rumors that the press's free access
lost the war for the United States.217 The Pentagon Papers, which led to the
injunction considered in New York Times Co. v. United States,218 also
related to the Vietnam War.219 The government argued in that case that the
Papers contained secret military information and sought to enjoin
publication on that basis. 220 The Court held that an injunction would be an
impermissible prior restraint under the First Amendment and that national
security was not a sufficient reason to enjoin publication.221
During the Persian Gulf War, the Pentagon created press pools, or groups
of reporters whose traveling and interviews were controlled by the
military.222 The reporters were rewarded and punished for the stories that
they wrote. 223 The military prevented them "from learning embarrassing or
unfavorable information." 224
209. Turner, supra note 205, at 597-98.
210. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596. The statute did allow for the defense
of truth and required the establishment of malicious intent. Id. §§ 2, 3.
211. Turner, supra note 205, at 598.
212. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. 1, 40 Stat. 217 (amended 1997).
213. Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1921).
214. Turner, supra note 205, at 598.
215. Id. at 599 (quoting Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 993, 1006 (4th ed.
2001)).
216. See Arzon, supra note 160, at 332.
217. See id. at 332-33.
218. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
219. See generally id.
220. See Turner, supra note 205, at 599-600.
221. See id. at 600. Note that this may have been in part because the war was already
over. See id.
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2. Freedom of Speech in the War on Terror
Theorists disagree as to whether the War on Terror is even more
deserving of deference to the government than the average war or whether it
is less deserving. On the one hand,
[a]s evidenced by the September 1 th... terrorist attacks on America, the
need for secrecy in national defense is arguably at its alltime greatest.
When coupled with the age of high speed and highly technical access to
information, it is no surprise that the leaders of this country demand that
the press, public access to information, and the spread of information, all
of which may be particularly sensitive to national defense, are restricted
in some manner.
On the other hand, there have been a number of setbacks for journalists
covering the War on Terror, making it difficult for them to cover the
progress of the war. Reporters and photographers were taken away from
the World Trade Center right after the terror attacks. 226 Military coverage
has been particularly problematic. The Department of Defense kept
reporters out of Afghanistan until the end of November 2001 while the
Pentagon debated the proper time to "introduce" the press. 227  On
December 6, 2001, reporters were locked in a warehouse to keep them from
covering a bomb explosion, 228 and another reporter, Doug Struck, was
restrained at gunpoint from investigating a missile impact area for national
security reasons.22 9 ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX, and CNN all agreed when
asked by the government not to air the tapes of Osama Bin Laden and his
followers, thereby restricting their own content. 230 During the most recent
war with Iraq, in March 2003, coverage was "muzzled" as a result of
"intimidation by the administration." 23 1
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT
Act), 232 passed quickly after the attacks by an overwhelming margin,
"expanded the government's ability to conduct electronic surveillance,"
limited attorney-client privilege, and expanded the FBI's power to collect
225. Turner, supra note 205, at 594.
226. See id at 607.
227. See id.
228. Id. at 608.
229. Sinai, supra note 32, at 179.
230. See Turner, supra note 205, at 608. Professor Turner argues that
the government's attempt to force the press to withhold publication of the contents
of the Bin Laden tapes would not withstand a constitutional review under New
York Times unless the government could show irreparable harm would
immediately follow publication of their content. However, the press itself chose to
withhold the tapes, precluding any constitutional analysis.
Id. at 612.
231. Magarian, supra note 6, at 119.
232. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 271 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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domestic intelligence. 233 It fundamentally expanded the power of the
Executive 234 for example, by restricting courtroom access to immigration
courts and secret military tribunals.235 The Act profoundly increased the
government's power to conduct surveillance. 236
The Pentagon and Former Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria Clarke
developed an embedding policy by which media organizations, in return for
being embedded within military units, agreed to "security reviews, flagging
of sensitive information, [and] limitations on filming dead bodies. ' 237 A
recent case in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held
that there is "no constitutionally based right for the media to embed with
U.S. military forces in combat," and therefore the restrictions were
constitutional. 238
This problem is made all the more urgent by the restriction of
information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) imposed by the
current Administration. FOIA, passed in 1966, was "one of the primary
channels of information-gathering." 239 The premise of the Act was that
citizens need access to government information to make the informed
decisions required in a democracy. 240 It is a powerful tool because, though
it is not the only way to get access to government information, FOIA
theoretically requires the government to bear the burden of proof when it
denies a request. 241
FOIA permits individuals to obtain federal agency records after a proper
written request is submitted.242 The government agency, however, may
233. See Olson, supra note 202, at 463.
234. See id. In fact, one criticism that can be made is that
[tihe irony in the government's attempt to foreclose access to images and
information related to the war on terrorism, ostensibly to protect privacy, is that
the government has simultaneously adopted laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act,
which in the name of fighting terrorism, facilitates the government's own invasive
information gathering activities.
Calvert, supra note 201, at 157.
235. See Olson, supra note 202, at 463-64. The Creppy Memorandum, already in the
process of challenge, required immigration judges to close certain hearings designated by
Attorney General John Ashcroft to the public. See Kitrosser, supra note 159, at 95. In the
Department of Justice's brief opposing certiorari in a Third Circuit challenge to the Creppy
Memorandum, it argued that there was no First Amendment right of public access to
Executive branch proceedings in general. See id. at 97.
236. See supra notes 233-35.
237. Arzon, supra note 160, at 345.
238. Calvert, supra note 201, at 152.
239. Turner, supra note 205, at 602.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 602-03. It may be even more powerful for journalists, because the
Electronic Freedom of Information Amendments to FOIA expedite the process for
journalists making agency requests. See id. at 603. The records may be received by a person
primarily engaged in disseminating information if a "compelling need," i.e. "an urgency to
inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government activity," is shown. Id.
242. See id. at 602.
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refuse if the request falls into one or more exempted categories. 24 3 One of
these categories is information classified because of national defense and
security concerns. 244 After September 11, 2001, the government was
concerned that free access to government information directly conflicted
with national security concerns. 245 As a result, Attorney General John
Ashcroft's office significantly enhanced government agency power to
withhold information under the FOIA national security exemption. 2 46 On
October 12, 2001, Ashcroft rescinded a directive instituted by former
Attorney General Janet Reno ordering agencies to use FOIA exemptions
minimally; instead, Ashcroft promised that those who used the exemptions
would be protected by the Department of Justice.24 7 This new directive
essentially negates the presumptive right to access information, because the
burden of proof is effectively on the requesters and not the agency.248
As a result of all of these new restrictions on the press, a constitutional
right to access may be even more critical, because the alternatives on which
the media generally relies are less potent.
II. CONFUSION IN THE LOWER COURTS: CAN PRIVATE GOVERNMENT
SPACE BECOME PUBLIC WHEN THE GOVERNMENT GRANTS ACCESS IN A
DISCRIMINATORY WAY?
The Supreme Court has not yet heard a case that specifically addresses
whether discriminatory press access to government information violates the
First Amendment. Circuit and district courts are thus left to deal with the
problem on their own. Subsection A considers different rationales for
finding discriminatory access unconstitutional. Subsection B articulates the
rationale advanced by courts that have found that discriminatory access
violates no constitutional principles.
A. Discriminatory Access Triggers a Right to Gather News
There are a number of rationales that a court might use to find that
discriminatory media access violates the First Amendment.
The Brennan test, which enables the First Amendment to act in
conjunction with the Equal Protection Clause, imposes a higher level of
scrutiny. 249 In order to find newsgathering to be a fundamental right under
243. See id. The exemptions are not mandatory, but the government may exercise them.
See id.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 603.
246. See id. at 610.
247. See id. Ashcroft's memo stated: "'Only if [the agency's] decisions lack a "sound
legal basis" or could lead to an unfavorable court decision that might impair the
government's ability to deny records in the future, would the department not support
denials."' Id.
248. See id. at 610-11.
249. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the First Amendment, one must meet each of the two prongs: a historical
tradition of access and a value of access. 250
The historical tradition would have to be considered on a case-by-case
basis. Thus far, only the criminal justice system has been found to have a
historical tradition of access,2 51 but the facts of some of these cases suggest
that other forums may have an equal claim.
In terms of the second prong, one could consider it from two separate
angles. The first angle is the structural role of the First Amendment in
fostering a republican system of self-government. 252 In order to have an
informed electorate, the debate on public issues ought to be "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open." 253 This structural model emphasizes conditions of
meaningful communication, not simply communication itself.2 54 As such,
individuals have an interest in expressing their opinions and contributing to
the public debate, but there is also a social interest in "the attainment of
truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but
carry it out in the wisest way."255 The press represents the public's social
interest.2 56
The second angle is that "[p]eople in an open society do not demand
infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what
they are prohibited from observing."2 57 In this sense, it is essential that the
press be given access so that people retain faith in their government. The
more that a leader, for example, appears to be screening out the questions of
those with whom he or she disagrees, the less faith the public may have in
that person's leadership.
The public forum doctrine distinguishes between government restrictions
based on content and government restrictions based on time, place, and
manner.258 In cases of discriminatory access based on content,
the government itself has balanced the interests, decided generally that
access is appropriate, but has denied it in the particular instance [or for
this particular person or point of view] . . . . [T]he government's
inconsistent responses to access claims suggest that it may be seeking to
suppress the dissemination of damaging information without justification
rather than asserting legitimate interests.259
Ultimately, content control invokes all of the same concerns in the media
context as it does in the public speech context, if not more serious concerns
250. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
252. See supra Part I.B.2.
253. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980).
254. See id. at 588.
255. Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (citing Z. Chafee, Free Speech in
the United States 33 (1954)).
256. See id. at 864.
257. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572.
258. See supra Part I.E.
259. Dyk, supra note 1, at 941.
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because of the media's function as informant of the public. Content control
is the very "essence of... forbidden censorship. '260
The lower courts have considered cases of discriminatory media access in
a number of contexts, and have used different rationales to decide these
cases. The following sections examine these rationales.
1. Equal Protection: Classifications Between Media Entities and
Fundamental Rights
Where courts use the Brennan test,26 1 they must pass an early critical
threshold by finding that there is a fundamental right of access before they
may use an equal protection analysis. 262 This does not necessarily require a
fundamental First Amendment right. In McCoy v. Providence Journal
Co.,263 for example, the court found that "no broad, general issue of
freedom of the press is presented, for the defendants, acting in their
respective official capacities, ha[d] not barred the press at large.' ' 264 Rather,
the fundamental right arose from the fact that the plaintiff (as well as other
news media outlets) already had a right to inspect the documents in
question, as they were a matter of public record.26 5
In Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester,2 66, the court did not decide the
case on equal protection grounds, but did allow the case to withstand a
summary judgment motion based on an argument to that effect. There, the
plaintiffs, employees of the Times Leader, a Wilkes Barre newspaper, were
denied access to records in the sole possession of the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources. 26 7 The Department's policy
prohibited the disclosure of certain categories of documents. A substantial
number of documents that the Department refused to turn over fell into
these categories.2 68  Though the claim had not been completely
substantiated at that procedural juncture, the Times Leader alleged an equal
protection violation based on discriminatory media access. The lower court
granted summary judgment to the Department. On appeal, the court held
that the claim was serious, vacating and remanding for the lower court to
260. Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
261. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
263. 190 F.2d 760 (1st Cir. 1951). But see infra notes 297-301 and accompanying text
(discussing a more recent First Circuit opinion that at least on the surface appears to be using
a pure First Amendment justification).
264. McCoy, 190 F.2d at 763.
265. See id. at 764. The court in this case considered an allegation that the mayor
prevented the Providence Journal from gaining access to fiscal records related to a tax
abatement in order to publish them while releasing those records to the Pawtucket Times. See
id. at 762. Once the Pawtucket Times had the records, the city passed an ordinance banning
all city officials from permitting anyone to examine the tax abatement or disclose the
contents of the abatement without the permission of the City Council. See id. at 762.
266. 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986).
267. Id. at 1165.
268. Id.
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consider the evidence. 269 Here, the fundamental right appears to arise from
the Department's policies themselves, as the Department's policies
permitted the disclosure of documents suppressed in this instance. 270 A
more recent case in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
United States v. Connolly, analyzed a discriminatory media access claim
and found the right to an open trial to be a fundamental right, satisfying this
threshold requirement of the Brennan test.271
Whether a more or less traditional fundamental rights rationale is used,
the next step in this analysis after finding a fundamental right is to consider
whether there has been an equal protection violation. The recent decision in
Connolly states: "It also is beyond dispute that only in the most
extraordinary circumstances is the government permitted, consistent with
the First Amendment, to discriminate between members of the press in
granting access to trials and other governmental proceedings." 272 Similarly,
once the court in McCoy held that the documents were a matter of public
record, it held that the mayor violated equal protection by releasing these
records to one media outlet but not the other.273
2. Discriminatory Access Violates the First Amendment
Other courts have struck down discriminatory media access to
government information on pure First Amendment grounds. There are a
number of methods by which courts assess the First Amendment right
involved. Some consider the method by which the government actor makes
decisions about whom to admit and whom to exclude. 274 Others prohibit
discrimination on the basis of the media outlet's content.275 Still others
explicitly use the framework of the public forum doctrine to judge whether
or not the discrimination is content-based. 276 Most courts, regardless of
how they explicitly justify their holdings, use the logic of the public forum
doctrine to justify those holdings.
A line of cases in the D.C. Circuit reflects a strong interest in how
decisions are made between media outlets. For instance, Sherrill v.
Knight277 involved a journalist's challenge to the denial of a White House
press pass based on the fact that there were no published or internal
regulations about the criteria on which issuance was based. 278 The
government argued that the public had no right of access to the White
269. Id. at 1176.
270. See id. at 1165.
271. See generally United States v. Connolly, 204 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. Mass. 2002).
272. Id. at 139.
273. See McCoy v. Providence Journal Co., 190 F.2d 760, 762 (1st Cir. 1951).
274. See infra notes 277-94 and accompanying text.
275. See infra notes 295-301 and accompanying text.
276. See infra notes 303-07 and accompanying text.
277. 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
278. See id. at 126-27. The journalist was a Washington correspondent from The Nation.
Id. at 126. The Secret Service denied the journalist a press pass and refused to give him a
reason for his rejection. See id. at 126-27.
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House and that the right of access due to the press is generally no greater
than the right of access to the public. 279 Therefore, the lack of guidelines
was a violation of the First Amendment only if the denial was based on the
content of the journalist's speech. 280 The journalist, on the other hand,
argued that he deserved "notice, opportunity to rebut, and a written
decision" because of the potential infringement on his First Amendment
rights. 281 The court agreed with the journalist that, not only are content-
based criteria problematic, but also that when a forum like the White House
establishes press facilities for correspondents, it is perceived as open to all
bona fide journalists.282 Government facilities that are open in this way
should not "be denied arbitrarily or for less than compelling reasons. '283
The government has a responsibility to prove a compelling government
interest for the restriction and must articulate or publish standards in some
way to ensure due process. 284 This due process is necessary not only for
the journalist, but also for the public: "Not only newsmen and the
publications for which they write, but also the public at large have an
interest protected by the first amendment in assuring that restrictions on
newsgathering be no more arduous than necessary, and that individual
newsmen not be arbitrarily excluded from sources of information. '285
The D.C. Circuit recently affirmed this holding in Getty Images News
Services, Corp. v. Department of Defense,286 holding that when the
Department of Defense restricts media access to Guantanamo Bay, the First
Amendment requires, "at a minimum, that before determining which media
organizations receive the limited access available, [the Department of
Defense (DOD)] must not only have some criteria to guide its
determinations, but must have a reasonable way of assessing whether the
criteria are met."'287 It was not enough for the Department of Defense to
articulate its principles 288 for choosing among media outlets once the
279. See id. at 129.
280. See id.
281. Id. at 128.
282. See id. at 129; see also infra note 303 and accompanying text (suggesting that
opening up a government space to the media may create a public forum).
283. Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129. But see Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Periodical
Correspondents' Ass'n, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that where Congress
promulgates clear rules that apply distinctions in a uniform way, the case is nonjusticiable).
284. See Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 130.
285. Id. at 129-30.
286. 193 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
287. Id. at 121.
288. According to the Department of Defense, there were four criteria that they
considered: (1) a mix of media types; (2) some preference to those media organizations that
consistently reach large audiences; (3) a desire to send at least some international media
organizations; and (4) a desire to send at least some regional news media because the stories
at Guantanamo Bay are at least partially regional in nature. See id. at 115. The Department
of Defense stated that they used all of the criteria to determine which media outlets were
permitted to go to Guantanamo, but admitted that nowhere were the criteria written or
published, and that there was no formal procedure by which the Department of Defense
made its decision. See id. at 116.
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government arrived in court. 289 Instead, the court stated that the only way
to satisfy the due process concerns that the limitation on First Amendment
rights raised was to publish the criteria that the Department of Defense used
to select journalists and provide them an opportunity to demonstrate that
they satisfied these criteria. 290
Getty clarifies the principles articulated in Sherrill. The court
acknowledged both that Guantanamo Bay was not a public forum and that
the government deserved heightened deference because of the "deference
due to military regulations and decision-making. ' 291 Despite these caveats,
claims of discriminatory media access, according to the court, "warrant
careful judicial scrutiny. ' 292 Though there is limited space available, once
the space is allocated to journalists (or the public), that space must be
allocated reasonably. 293
This concern with procedure seems to be linked to the process of
discriminating among media outlets as opposed to discriminating on the
basis of content in other ways. For example, when the government
restricted media coverage of the arrival of soldiers' remains to the port of
entry but did not change the preexisting policy that allowed the media and
civilians to observe other activities at the military base, the D.C. Circuit
held that there was no impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 294 The
court reasoned that the policy applied uniformly to all media outlets and the
rest of the public, "regardless of their views on war or the United States
military." 295
Some courts find that unequal access by journalists is impermissible
regardless of any public forum analysis, so long as the discrimination is
content-based. The First Circuit,2 96 for example, broadly held that "[t]here
may be a rare situation in which continued application of a protective order
could be justified after one media entity but not another was granted access.
We cannot, however, think of one."'297 Such an arrangement would result
289. Id.
290. See id.
291. Id. at 119. Note, however, that the court reserves the question of how this principle
might change were this a question of intervention in a military operation. See id. at 121. The
court points out, however, that the detention at Guantanamo Bay is an ongoing operation that
is likely to continue into "the foreseeable future." See id. Therefore, "the situation at
Guantanamo Bay does not seem to present the same set of challenges that more temporary
and mercurial military operations might." Id. at 122.
292. Id. at 119.
293. See id. at 120.
294. See JB Pictures, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 86 F.3d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
295. Id.
296. Note that the court relies on the Second Circuit holding in ABC v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d
1080 (2d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of this case, see infra note 306 and accompanying
text. But see supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text (discussing McCoy, in which the
court used the Brennan test).
297. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 24 (1st Cir. 1986). In this case a trial court in
a tort case granted exclusive access to court materials to one media outlet to the exclusion of
others. See id. at 3. For another example of a case finding broadly that content-based
discrimination between media outlets violated the First Amendment, see Times-Picayune
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in the construction of a media organization as a "privileged media entity"
with sole access to particular information, allowing that media entity to
shape and mold information.29 8 The fact that others would later be able to
re-publish the information is irrelevant, because the entire situation
allows the government to influence the type of substantive media
coverage that public events will receive. Such a practice is
unquestionably at odds with the first amendment. Neither the courts nor
any other branch of the government can be allowed to affect the content
or tenor of the news by choreographing which news organizations have
access to relevant information. 299
One may not, however, be able to extend this holding beyond the trial
context involved here. The fact that this case involved judicial documents
suggests that this case is really about the Brennan test, though the First
Circuit did not expressly address the issue in its opinion. 30 0 The First
Circuit also uses the Brennan test under other circumstances. 301  For
instance, a recent district court case from the First Circuit buttresses the
Brennan test reading: "It also is beyond dispute that only in the most
extraordinary circumstances is the government permitted, consistent with
the First Amendment, to discriminate between members of the press in
granting access to trials and other governmental proceedings. 3 02
Still other courts resort to the language of the public forum doctrine. The
Supreme Court recognizes traditional public forums, "defined by the
objective characteristics of the property, such as whether, 'by long tradition
or by government fiat,' the property has been 'devoted to assembly and
debate. '"'303 There are also designated public forums that the government
creates by acting purposefully to open "a nontraditional public forum" for
public discourse.30 4
Even before the Supreme Court explicitly recognized designated public
forums, the Second Circuit 305 articulated a similar principle, arguing not
Publ'g Co. v. Lee, 15 Media L. Rep. 1713 (E.D. La. 1988) (observing that "[d]iscriminatory
government action aimed at the communicative impact of expression is presumptively at
odds with the First Amendment," and that "[a]bove all else, the First Amendment means that
the government cannot restrict freedom of expression on the basis of its ideas, message, or
content"). Note, however, that there is also an alternative explanation for this holding: the
case involved a reporter barred from attending press conferences and cut off from public
information officers, which suggests that the decision may be more influenced by the public
forum doctrine cases. See infra notes 303-313 and accompanying text.
298. See Times Picayune Publ'g Co., 15 Media L. Rep. at 9.
299. Id.
300. See generally id.
301. See supra notes 263-265, 271 and accompanying text.
302. United States v. Connolly, 204 F. Supp. 2d 138, 139 (D. Mass. 2002).
303. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 667 (1998) (quoting Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ.'s Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
304. Id.
305. While a number of the Second Circuit cases specifically cited here are older,
Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2004), recently affirmed the cases' vitality. See
id. at 146.
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only that the government can open a place to public discourse but also that
the invitation of journalists by virtue of their status as members of the press
creates a public forum:
We think that once the press is invited... there is a dedication of those
premises to public communications use .... The issue is not whether the
public is or is not generally excluded, but whether the members of the
broadcast media are generally excluded. If choice were allowed for
discrimination in a public event of this magnitude in the various media,
then we reject the contention that it is within the prerogative of a political
candidate. We rather think that the danger would be that those of the
media who are in opposition or who the candidate thinks are not treating
him fairly would be excluded. And thus we think it is the public which
would lose. 306
Thus, it is the fact that the function, forum, or comment has become
public through the invitation of journalists rather than their general
exclusion that makes the difference. 30 7 The court found the appropriate test
for a permanent injunction to be (1) whether any party, either the media or
the public, would suffer irreparable injury if that media outlet were to be
foreclosed out of the information; and (2) whether the plaintiff is likely to
succeed upon trial of a permanent injunction (based on whether a First
Amendment right is being violated and whether the relevant behavior is
sufficient state action).30 8 An assertion that a particular media outlet would
provide "additional and unique" coverage may be sufficient to find
irreparable injury. 309
306. ABC v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977). This case involved ABC
journalists who were arrested or threatened with arrest when they tried to enter the
candidates' quarters during the New York mayoral Democratic primary. See id. at 1082. In
their defense, the candidates stated that because ABC was in the middle of a bargaining
dispute, they feared that by permitting ABC reporters to enter, NBC and CBS would refuse
to cover the campaign. See id. The plaintiffs presented the court with the question of
whether refusing access to ABC violated the First Amendment. See id. The court considered
the interests of those who watched ABC exclusively either by choice or by necessity as part
of the irreparable harm analysis. See id. It concluded that these viewers would suffer
irreparable injury because they might not know that they were being foreclosed of
knowledge of the information and therefore would not be able to act as informed citizens in
the manner contemplated by the First Amendment. See id.
307. See id.
308. See id. at 1082.
309. WPIX v. League of Women Voters, 595 F. Supp. 1484, 1491-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
see also id. at 1493 ("The first amendment strongly suggests, if it does not mandate, that no
court should find a lack of irreparable injury when a purveyor of news and opinion to the
American public is able to make a colorable case that its message will not otherwise be
conveyed."). The plaintiffs, operators of a local television station and producers of a
nationally syndicated news program, wanted to record the 1984 presidential and vice-
presidential debates, but the League of Women Voters, organizers of the debates, insisted on
permitting only pooled coverage of the debates. See id. at 1485-86. Complaining that they
could not afford the "unreasonably" high fee charged by the three major networks, the
plaintiffs requested that the League permit them access. The League, however, refused. See
id. at 1486. The court found that a record demonstrating that pooling may be necessary does
not necessarily end the analysis. See id. at 1490. This is the equivalent of a time, place, and
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In considering the merits of the First Amendment claim, the Second
Circuit has stated that the purpose of this "limited right of equal access to
important public events" is to "maximize diversity of coverage." 310 To
explain the value of such a rule, the Second Circuit court in WPIX v.
League of Women Voters cited directly to Cox v. New Hampshire,3t l
referring specifically to public forum doctrine and the difference between
time, place, and manner restrictions and content-based restrictions. 312 On
balance, cases in the Second Circuit suggest that "the cost of the restriction
in terms of loss of editorial freedom and newsgathering" may outweigh the
practical benefits that government actors may derive from the
restrictions. 313
B. There Is No Right Under the First Amendment to Equal Media Access to
Government Information
Part II.B. 1 considers possible rationales for determining that there is no
right to equal access. Part II.B.2 articulates the rationale used by the circuit
courts to deny a right of equal access to journalists.
1. Rationale for Not Finding a Right to Equal Access to Government
Information
Courts have emphasized that extending media access to government
information is an executive and legislative task, left up to the political
process. 314 One reason is that a judicial solution would run the risk of
being overinclusive. As the Supreme Court articulated in Houchins,
[there] are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the
prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the
manner restriction. See id. The important question is whether that restriction "'is exerted so
as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge... the opportunities for the communication of
thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to public
places."' Id. (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941)). In this case, the
plaintiffs explained that they had "purposes and techniques distinct from those" of the major
networks that formed the pool, id. at 1490-91, and the court found that the differences in
visual perspective were significant enough to deprive viewers of a particular perspective. See
id. at 1492.
310. Id. at 1489.
311. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
312. WPIX, 595 F. Supp. at 1490. Even if the restriction on equal access is not content-
based, the limitation must serve a legitimate government purpose, be rationally related to
that purpose, and must "outweigh the systemic benefits inherent in unrestricted (or lesser-
restricted) access." Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 164, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1987);
see also Times-Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. Lee, 15 Media L. Rep. 1713 (E.D. La. 1988)
(holding that selective denial of access is unconstitutional regardless of whether a public
forum is involved unless the regulation satisfies a compelling interest).
313. Stevens, 665 F. Supp. at 177.
314. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978).
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citizen's opportunities to gather information... but that does not make
entry into the White House a First Amendment right.315
In other words, if reporters could argue that any government action that
reduced the data flow to reporters was a First Amendment violation, there
would be no semblance of balance between the legitimate concessions that
must be made to maintain an independent media and the legitimate
government right to keep some information secret.
Judicially mandated values would result in "standardless decision-
making." 316  Courts, rather than applying the law, would be forced to
legislate categories of exclusion, which would result in never-ending
litigation.317 This illustrates how ill-equipped the judiciary is to apply a
principle of equal media access as a First Amendment right, and how
appropriate it is for a political solution.
Even some members of the media agree that these decisions should be
left to the political arena. An editorial in the Washington Post about a case
in which a governor denied one newspaper access to his office stated,
I don't see in the Constitution where anyone, even the governor, is
obliged to answer the calls of a particular reporter. (Of course, press
secretaries, who are paid to talk to the press, should have to talk to all
comers).... Why should [the governor] have to talk to a reporter he
thinks is unfair? '3 18
Ultimately, the purpose of the First Amendment is to guarantee the right
to communicate and, for the media, a right to publish. The right of access is
not essential to guarantee communication or publication. 319 In fact, a
careful reading of the First Amendment suggests that not only is it
unnecessary, but that it does not comport with the plain language of the
Amendment. The Amendment prohibits interference, suggesting that it is
unlikely that it was intended to mean an absolute right to know and a
concomitant government duty to disclose. 320
The case law does not lead to the conclusion that discriminatory denial of
access or any other denial of access ought to constitute a First Amendment
violation. Even Branzburg, so often touted for its observation that there
must be some First Amendment protection for newsgathering, has been too
often misinterpreted; in fact, "a fair reading of... Branzburg makes plain
that the result hinged on an assessment of the competing societal interests
involved in that case rather than any determination that First Amendment
freedoms were not implicated."'321
315. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
316. Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1172 (3d Cir. 1986).
317. See id.
318. Balt. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 356 F. Supp. 2d 577, 580 n.2 (N.D. Md. 2005).
319. See id.
320. See Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1168.
321. Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 859-60 (1974).
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Most importantly, though Justice Brennan articulates a test in Richmond
Newspapers that sounds like it might allow the doctrine to extend to new
situations, this "experience and logic" test has not been applied outside of
the criminal trial process. 32 2 Moreover, the court has never indicated that it
would be comfortable applying the test beyond criminal judicial
proceedings. To the extent that the Court has considered cases outside of
the criminal justice system, it has applied Houchins.323
2. The Fourth Circuit Denies a Right to Equal Access
Courts that have decided that discriminatory access is not problematic
often rely heavily on the fact that, so long as the press has no constitutional
right to access generally, government may restrict access in any way it
pleases. In Snyder v. Ringgold,324 the court considered a § 1983 claim for
alleged violations of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by a defendant
who was employed by the police department and responsible for
disseminating information to the media. 325 The plaintiff, Terrie Snyder,
alleged that the police official denied her constitutional rights by refusing to
grant her access while allowing access by other media entities. 326 In 1992,
the plaintiff aired a story alleging a cover-up by the police department; after
that, she claimed, she began experiencing difficulties obtaining information
from the police department, more so than other journalists. 327
Subsequently, the department changed its policy, requiring a Public
Information Officer (PIO) to give all information to journalists and to be on
call on weekends for journalists to page.328 Shortly after this policy was
instituted, the defendant told Snyder that he was tired of answering her
weekend pages. 329
Snyder then published an article with a statement in it that the defendant
claimed was made off the record to another reporter.3 30 In return, the
defendant sent a letter stating that he would never go off the record with
another reporter from the plaintiffs station, WBAL, and had ordered his
staff to do the same. 331 From the time of that letter, the defendant would
not allow Snyder to participate with the TV crew in filming interviews with
officials, refused to talk to her about any story, and would not let her get
any information from the department without submitting her request in
322. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
323. See id.
324. 26 Media L. Rep. 1249 (4th Cir. 1998).
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writing. 332 The lower court held that defendant was not entitled to qualified
immunity, saying that the department could not treat reporters unequally. 333
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit explained that a finding of qualified
immunity requires that the right asserted be a clearly established right. 334
Based on that standard, it concluded that the right to equal access had not
been clearly established in either the Supreme Court or the Fourth
Circuit.335 No constitutional right establishes that reporters get equal or
nondiscriminatory access to government information which is not generally
publicly available. 336 The plaintiff asserted a broad right to equal access to
government information sources and similar treatment to other journalists,
which, according to the court, would preclude exclusive interviews, the
common practice of officials declining to speak to reporters whom they see
as untrustworthy because they have violated confidentiality or distorted
their comments, or selective access to the White House. 337 As a result,
plaintiff s claim would alter long-accepted journalistic practice, suggesting
that it is not a clearly established right.338 Additionally, the court explained
that a right of equal access could not be conferred without a holding that the
press has privileged First Amendment status, and there is no doctrine to
support that. 339 The court also pointed out that prior decisions that had used
the content-based restriction language from the public forum doctrine to
support a right of access were behaving rather disingenuously:
[I]t is a large analytical leap from holding that government may not
regulate or prohibit private speech on the basis of content or viewpoint to
holding that government may not make "content-based" distinctions
between reporters in granting access to government information. Indeed,
the government can certainly control the content of its own speech in
ways it could never regulate or control the content of private speech.
Arguably, by analogy, the government should be able to choose to limit
332. See id. at 1250-51. Note that the plaintiff claimed that the restrictions were because
of the content of her stories; the defendant, however, contested this claim and said that she
had been cut off because she violated confidentiality and abused the paging system. See id.
at 1251.
333. See id. (stating that "absent a 'compelling governmental interest,' once a government
agency or official makes such information generally available to the news media, such
agency and/or official may not treat members of the news media, including the reporters
working for such news organizations, unequally" (internal quotations omitted)).
334. See id. The standard is that the right is clearly established if "it has been
'specifically adjudicated,' that is, if it has been authoritatively decided by the Supreme
Court, the appropriate United States Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state' in
which the officers acted" or where "it is manifestly included within more general
applications of the core constitutional principle invoked." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
335. See id.
336. See id. The court noted that there is no support for such a proposition except for
three relatively old out-of-circuit cases, including those cited supra, Part II.A and
accompanying text. See id.
337. See id. at 1252.
338. See id.
339. See id. In fact, the Supreme Court held in Branzburg, described supra notes 69-71,
that the press has no special rights beyond those of a normal citizen. Id.
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its audience in a way it could not choose to limit the audience available to
private speakers. 340
A recent district court decision used similar reasoning to come to a
similar conclusion. In Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich,34 1 the plaintiff, the
Baltimore Sun newspaper, initiated a suit against the governor of Maryland
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.3 42 The governor's press
office had issued a memorandum to state public information offices and the
Executive Department directing that no one in those offices speak with
either David Nitkin or Michael Olesker, two reporters for the Baltimore
Sun, until further notice.343 The officials were not to return their phone
calls or comply with any of their requests.344 The directive was based on
the governor's perception that the two reporters were failing to report
objectively on the administration. 345 After the directive was issued, the
state government employees who used to speak with the reporters refused to
speak with them, at least one of the reporters felt that he was being deprived
of certain information, and numerous officials stopped returning phone calls
and offered no reason for doing SO.346 The reporters, however, were
permitted to attend press conferences that were open to members of the
public and their public information requests continued to be honored. 347
They were, however, excluded from a press briefing. 348
The District Court noted that the Supreme Court "has refused to
recognize-or construct-a First Amendment right of access to all sources
of information within governmental control. '349 The problem in fashioning
the right was the lack of discernible judicial standards, which would result
in ad hoc standards applied individually to cases. 350 The resolution of the
340. Id. at 1253 (citations omitted). Note that the plaintiffs in this case relied on an old
district court case in the Fourth Circuit, see id. at 1251, in which the court found a right of
equal access in the case of explicitly public areas. See Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906, 909
(D. Haw. 1974) (stating that there is a right of equal access to "public galleries, the press
rooms, and the press conferences dealing with government"). The Fourth Circuit, however,
did not endorse this opinion in Snyder, but instead referred to it as a "relatively old federal
district court decision." Snyder, 26 Media L. Rep. at 1251. Indeed, the court then cited to
Anderson, Cuomo, and Sherrill in support of its finding that the plaintiff was unable to
establish Fourth Circuit precedent and to illustrate similar facts. See id. On remand, the
district court found more generally that were this a general news conference open to all
media, the government official might not be able to deny entry to any given member of the
press, but did not address the question of an intermediate scenario in which more than a few
reporters were invited but the forum was not generally open to all members of the press. See
Snyder v. Ringgold, 40 F. Supp. 2d 714, 717 (D. Md. 1999).
341. 356 F. Supp. 2d 577 (D. Md. 2005).
342. See id. at 578.




347. See id. at 579-80.
348. See id. at 580. A press briefing is a smaller gathering limited to a small number of
press members and by invitation only. Id.
349. Id. (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978)).
350. See id.
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conflict between those seeking access and those holding information should
be resolved, according to the court, by political forces. 351 As in Snyder, the
court found that "[a]s the First and Fourteenth Amendments are currently
understood in this Circuit, a government may lawfully make content-based
distinctions in the way it provides press access to information not available
to the public generally." 352 It was clear that the expectations that the two
reporters had were beyond any reasonable public expectation; though the
Sun sought to be recognized as a protected actor, "that desire [was] not a
cognizable basis for injunctive relief. '353
III. ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF DIFFERENTIAL ACCESS TO MEDIA
ORGANIZATIONS
Though the circuit courts have emphatically decided either in favor of or
against permitting discriminatory access to government information and
officials, they have diverged widely on their reasons for doing SO. 3 54 Some
focus on Equal Protection arguments, while others use First Amendment
doctrine in order to find that journalists have a right of equal access to
government sources. From these starting points, the circuit courts differ
substantially in their reasoning.
Part III.A reviews the rationales offered by the different circuits for their
holdings. Part III.B applies these rationales to the debate about the role of
the media in American politics and analyzes which rationales best fit the
articulated roles. Part III.C considers, more specifically, the various
theories associated with a First Amendment right to media access and
applies these theories to the problem of discriminatory access. Part III.D
articulates the appropriate standard that the Supreme Court ought to apply
when it hears a case on discriminatory access. Finally, Part III.E considers
the role of the current political climate and the War on Terror in
determining whether courts ought to be more deferential to government
decisions about denying access, in a discriminatory manner or not, to
government information during wartime.
A. Divergence of Opinion in the Lower Courts
The lower courts have considered both an equal protection rationale and
a First Amendment rationale in deciding discriminatory access cases.
351. See id.
352. Id. at 581.
353. Id. at 582.
354. See supra Part II.
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1. Equal Protection Rationale
The First Circuit and the Third Circuit have both based decisions on the
formulation in the Brennan test.355 What varies is the means of locating a
fundamental right.35
6
The First Circuit, in Anderson, without explicitly finding a fundamental
right or applying heightened scrutiny, nonetheless suggested that denying
access to government records to one newspaper but not others violates
equal protection. 357 Nevertheless, there are hints in the opinion that the
court would need to find a fundamental right under the First Amendment in
order to apply the equal protection doctrine effectively. The fact that this
case involves access to judicial documents suggests that the court may be
applying the analysis in Richmond News of a fundamental right to access
information from the judicial branch to the executive branch.358
The Third Circuit in Capital Cities Media, Inc. applied a similar
standard, but the rationale in the opinion is fuzzy because the court did not
clearly establish whether it was applying the Richmond News holding to a
separate First Amendment claim articulated by the plaintiff or the equal
protection argument discussed later in the opinion.359 If the Richmond
News rationale discussed in the opinion applied only to the plaintiffs First
Amendment claim, then the court's remand for fact-finding on the equal
protection claim was based solely on the First Amendment, then the First
Amendment claim itself could be seen as the source of the fundamental
right. If not, then the equal protection doctrine can only have an effect if
the court finds a preexisting fundamental right of access. 360
2. First Amendment Rationale
According to the D.C. Circuit, where there are no published or articulated
standards but the government nevertheless decides which press members to
admit and which to reject, such arbitrary methods violate the First
Amendment. 36 1 On the other hand, once internal regulations are published
and enforced by the relevant government body, so long as they are made
pursuant to the power of that body of government to make rules governing
355. See supra Part II.A.1.
356. See supra notes 261-73 and accompanying text. The Equal Protection Clause
examination was triggered in McCoy, for example, because the city government in that case
treated two similarly situated defendants differently. See generally McCoy v. Providence
Journal Co., 190 F.2d 760 (1st Cir. 1951).
357. See supra notes 296-302.
358. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
359. Note that the First Amendment claim and the equal protection claim are discussed in
separate sections of the opinion, and the section discussing the equal protection claim
divulges no hint of the standard of review being applied, primarily because the equal
protection claim was insufficiently pleaded in the plaintiffs brief. See Capital Cities Media,
Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1174-76 (3d Cir. 1986).
360. See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 277-95 and accompanying text.
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its own procedure, decisions based on these regulations are branded
nonjusticiable political actions.362
The Second Circuit's reasoning proceeds in two steps. First, the court
determines whether the plaintiff alleges an irreparable injury either to itself
or to the public. 363 The court then performs a First Amendment analysis by
asking whether or not the press has been invited; if so, the court considers
the premises open to the public and applies a rationale similar to the public
forum cases. 364 If there is an irreparable injury and the press has been
invited, then a permanent injunction may issue.365
The Fourth Circuit, conversely, denies journalists a constitutional right to
equal access under the First Amendment. 366 The court emphasizes that
finding such a right of access in discriminatory cases would alter
established journalistic practice and would confer a privileged First
Amendment status on the press without appropriate doctrinal support. 367
The court also objects to the finding of a First Amendment violation based
on the creation of a public forum through the invitation of some media
entities by other circuits, claiming that it is too large an "analytical leap" to
infer from the fact that the government may not discriminate between
private speakers on the basis of content that government may not choose
what it says to various journalists. 368
B. What Is the Role of the Media in American Politics?
The inclusion of the Press Clause in the Constitution suggests that the
framers envisioned that the media would, at least, play a role either within
government or as a representative of the people. The Press Clause's
presence in the Bill of Rights suggests that its role is related to the
prevention of tyranny. 369 Also, the fact that the Constitution envisions
abridgment of the rights of the press is an acknowledgment that politics
might not be able to effectively police government abridgment of the
press. 370 Though representatives have been fairly responsive in the past,
the explicit constitutional protection ought to apply both when government
is willing to grant it and when government is unwilling. 371  This is
especially important in times of war, the only time in which government has
sought to suppress political speech.372 Moreover, the courts have asserted
362. See supra note 283.
363. See supra notes 308-09 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 305-07 and accompanying text. See also Section I.E for a discussion
of the public forum doctrine and the distinctions that the doctrine articulates between time,
place, and manner restrictions and content-based restrictions.
365. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
366. See supra Part ll.B.
367. See supra notes 336-339 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 12-13 and accompanying text.
370. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
371. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.F.
372. See supra Part I.F.
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institutional competence to determine when access ought to be granted in
the Richmond News line of cases; thus, there is no reason why courts should
not be able to address the question of whether the press may assert a right to
equal access. 373
Regardless of whether politics could adequately determine its role, one
must ask why the media ought to receive any sort of special protection. The
theoretical construct of the media as the Fourth Estate of government, while
attractive, finds little support in the text of the Constitution and no support
in the doctrine. 374 Instead, the Constitution seems to envision the press as a
member of the public. 375  Therefore, perhaps the more appropriate
understanding of the Press Clause is one that ties the press into the
individual rights articulated elsewhere in the Bill of Rights, particularly the
First Amendment, which contains the press clause and focuses on free
speech.
Though the history of the First Amendment's passage does not suggest
that the founders intended the press to have any institutional privileges
beyond that of any other private business, 376 the fact, again, that the Press
Clause is in the Bill of Rights suggests that the right of a free press is a right
of the citizens themselves rather than the press as an institution. The
doctrine of access to government information reinforces this reading, both
in denying a general right of access and implying a fundamental right of
access in limited cases. In both Pell and Richmond News and their
respective progenies, the right of access depends on whether the public has
been, or ought to be, granted access to the government information.377 The
press, then, must be given freedom to speak because it acts as an
institutionalized form of the public.
C. Theories of the First Amendment and Their Relationship to the
Discriminatory Access Conundrum
The glue that holds the theoretical foundation of a media right of equal
access together is that the doctrine ought to reflect the purposes of the First
Amendment. Professor Barry P. McDonald's observation that the
newsgathering doctrine is moving the media farther away from fulfilling its
constitutionally protected role suggests that granting equal access to
government information, and thereby restoring the press's intended function
as a watchdog or the Fourth Estate of government, is appropriate. 378
Though construing an equal right of access as a systemic right is
attractive, because it avoids some of the pitfalls of First Amendment
doctrine, 379 the First Amendment ought to provide sufficient protection
373. See supra Part I.B.2 (explaining the Richmond News line of cases).
374. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 56-57 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
377. See supra Part I.B.3.
378. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
379. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.2.
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without looking to any other constitutional rights, 380 The framers included
freedom of the press in the First Amendment, making it an explicit right.
As an explicit right, it both establishes a right of access more firmly and
provides a rationale for its protection: free speech.
The most important theory in considering discriminatory access cases is
the multiplicity of views theory. 381 If the best way to inform the population
and encourage robust debate is to encourage diverse perspectives in the
marketplace of ideas, 382 then allowing the government to stifle particular
media outlets or journalists because they present a particular perspective
denies the very purpose of the Press Clause. Though the multiplicity of
views theory can never be perfectly implemented because the media
functions as a private organization and therefore will always conform to
financial pressures, 383 preventing government from making content-based
distinctions protects the purpose of the First Amendment.
The effectiveness test bears heavily on whether the government has a
right to grant access in a discriminatory way, but for slightly different
reasons than those expressed in Professor Easton's effectiveness theory.
According to his articulation, the effectiveness test prevents the government
from suppressing information that is already available through other
media.384 The problematic aspect of discriminatory media access when
discrimination results from content-based restrictions, however, is not that
the information is already available in the marketplace of ideas, but rather
that if the government is allowed to discriminate on the basis of content,
certain unfavorable information may never come to light. The fact that the
government may choose to divulge government information to some media
actors but not others is not necessarily arbitrary, as Easton characterizes
it,385 but may rather be the result of the government attempting to affect not
only the tenor of the news but also its content. 386 Thus, not only would the
number of providers increase by preventing government from granting
discriminatory access, but the quality of the coverage and the benefit that it
makes available to citizens would also increase. News organizations would
be more likely to report honestly and fairly on government representatives
rather than reporting favorably merely to increase the chances that they
could maintain access to those officials. This relates to the way in which
the right to receive information fits into the discriminatory access
question-the effectiveness test ought not to be whether the information is
already publicly available, but rather whether the right to receive
380. See supra Part I.B. 1-2.
381. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
383. See generally Magarian, supra note 6.
384. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
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information is being compromised by government officials engaging in
image control. 387
D. The Adoption of an Appropriate Standard
Ultimately, the standard adopted in the Second Circuit appears to be the
most workable option for an ultimate resolution to this thorny problem. 388
The standard articulated by the equal protection rationale cases simply
would make it too difficult to find an equal right of access for members of
the press, allowing some meritorious claims to fall through the cracks. As
an initial matter, the standard is unclear and poorly articulated in some of
the cases. 389 If the standard actually requires that the court use rational
basis review unless it can identify a fundamental right that ratchets up the
level of review to heightened scrutiny, finding such a right may prove to be
extraordinarily difficult no matter how compelling the facts. The Brennan
test has not proved workable in extending much beyond the facts to which it
was originally applied.390 Therefore, a fundamental right would be implied
only in those limited cases exactly mapping the facts of McCoy, 39 1 in which
the media already has a right to the information.
The D.C. Circuit cases offer a good illustration of how to impose
appropriate restrictions both in the presence and the absence of a public
forum. 392  This concern with process comports with general First
Amendment doctrine and complements the Second Circuit's public forum
test both by providing a means of imposing time, place, and manner
restrictions and by allocating limited space in the absence of a finding of a
public forum.
3 9 3
The First Circuit approach, which employs all-encompassing language
and reasoning, does not take into account typical journalistic practices
including exclusive interviews and source leaks. 394 Had the court limited
its holding to the judicial branch, one might argue that the conflation of the
fundamental right of access to judicial proceedings and documents, in
combination with equal protection concerns, is the reason for the
heightened review.395 Because the court extended the holding in dictum to
all branches of government, however, the holding appears to be based on
the First Amendment and simply cannot be sustained without severely
altering the way in which journalists conduct business.
387. See supra notes 160-68 for a discussion of the right to receive information.
388. See supra notes 363-65 and accompanying text.
389. See, e.g., supra notes 355-60 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
391. 190 F.2d 760 (lst Cir. 1951).
392. See supra notes 361-62 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 277-93 and accompanying text.
394. For examples of articulations of these concerns, see supra notes 333-34.
395. See supra notes 119-24 for a discussion of the extent to which access to judicial
proceedings and documents is considered a fundamental right and the other areas to which
courts have extended this principle.
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The reasoning in the Fourth Circuit, while compelling, ultimately does
not fulfill the purposes of the First Amendment. Though it is true that there
is no general right of access to government information, the government has
created such a right by offering the information to some media outlets but
not others, which, despite the arguments to the contrary, is problematic
from the perspective of First Amendment theory. The Fourth Circuit
implicitly concedes that there would be a right of equal access were the
information public or the media generally admitted; this, however, does not
effectively address the full range of problematic conduct.396 The standard,
without more, satisfies the effectiveness test proposed by Easton, but does
not address the problem of multiplicity of views when the information is
less than completely public or the more nuanced issue of when the
government may create a public forum by inviting multiple, but not all,
journalists while excluding others.397
The Second Circuit's approach solves many of these problems. Unlike
the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit recognizes the value of transplanting
the public forum doctrine into the press clause context. 398 The Second
Circuit also recognizes the complexity of determining what a public forum
is in the context of media access, and formulates a test: Whether the forum
(be it a classic press room or a general policy of speaking to all journalists
but one) is more generally inclusive than it is exclusive.3 99 The important
factor is not whether the interaction looks like a press briefing or like a
series of exclusive interviews with all media organizations except for the
one in question; instead, what ought to matter is whether a journalist is
denied access to government information to which other media outlets
generally have access, potentially chilling speech by allowing the
government to communicate to journalists that they may be denied access if
396. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
397. See, for example, supra notes 381-87 for a comparison of the multiplicity of views
theory and the effectiveness test and supra note 306 for a discussion of the effect of
government creating a public forum by inviting members of the press.
398. See supra notes 340, 306 and accompanying text. It is clear from the theoretical
underpinnings of the First Amendment that the rationale for the public forum doctrine
applies equally in the context of the Press Clause regardless of whether one sees the media as
the Fourth Estate or as a proxy for the public, as, in both cases, there is value to
nondiscrimination on the basis of content. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
399. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. Note that this test also takes into
account the Fourth Circuit's concerns about exclusive interviews because these are clearly
more inclusive than exclusive, even if the government grants an exclusive interview to
several media entities rather than just one, and therefore does not mandate preferential
treatment for all. See supra note 337 and accompanying text. The test does not, however,
take into account the practice of exclusion of journalists who violate confidentiality or other
such journalistic conventions. See supra note 337 and accompanying text. One could argue
that this is the price that one has to pay for ensuring that the government does not
discriminate on the basis of content, analogizing to the public forum context in which
government may not impose restrictions that might otherwise be valid if they may result in
discrimination on the basis of content because of the vital First Amendment interests at
stake. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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they portray the government in a negative light.400 The Second Circuit's
analysis under the irreparable harm test illustrates that its doctrine is in
keeping with the purposes of the First Amendment: The courts will find
irreparable harm if the exclusion of certain media outlets prevents the
public from receiving unique perspectives under the multiplicity of views
theory. 40'
E. The Effect of the War on Terror
The War on Terror and the expected reduction of civil liberties that
accompanies wartime further complicates the already thorny analysis
resulting from all of this conflicting doctrine. The Supreme Court hesitated
to extend a right of access to government information in times of peace, and
in times of war or other national stress this tendency is further
exacerbated. 40 2 The public seems to have acquiesced in some curtailment
of civil liberties in response to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and
the exercise of a number of other executive powers, all of which expand
government power in the area of law enforcement at the expense of
individual rights.403
There is certainly great need to maintain secrecy in national defense
during the War on Terror, as supporters of the USA PATRIOT Act and
other supporters of more restrictions on civil liberties maintain.404
Although fighting terrorism may require less military force than
conventional wars, it entails more intelligence, which intuitively suggests
more secrecy. Nevertheless, granting access to some media organizations
while excluding others avoids implicating many of the same concerns. The
effectiveness test appropriately applies here, in the sense that the
government information is already out and therefore cannot implicate a
serious national security concern. 405 Therefore, while the issue concerns
free speech at a time of war, it does not touch on national security in the
same way. Mere embarrassment is insufficient to allow the government to
limit free speech where it would otherwise be granted.
400. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. Consider, for example, the multiplicity
of situations in which courts have found a First Amendment right to access. See, e.g., supra
notes 286-90 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment due process concerns
when the government grants some reporters access to Guantanamo Bay while denying access
to others); supra note 306 (discussing that when candidates invited some media members
into their quarters, they thereby created a public forum); supra note 309 (discussing that the
government violates the First Amendment by requiring media organizations to form press
pools, thereby excluding the viewpoints of those who cannot afford those pools).
401. See supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 226-38 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text. As Easton points out, "[h]ow
important can the government's asserted interest in suppression be if it allows access to some
arbitrarily chosen members of the public or to the entire world via some other medium?" See
Easton, supra note 140, at 36.
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CONCLUSION
Discriminatory access does not, in itself, threaten democracy. Journalists
and government sources regularly engage in practices that involve some
discrimination between media outlets; exclusive interviews are merely the
most visible example. Therefore, an outright ban on discriminatory access
would be inappropriate and might even be detrimental to the public's right
to know; who knows, for example, whether confidential sources would
continue to talk to the media if they had to share the same information with
all members of the media equally?
On the other hand, granting a blank check to government officials to
exclude or include media outlets as they choose condones the abuse of
government control over exclusive information, allowing government to
control the public perception of its activities to the detriment of the public.
During wartime, this effect is magnified, both because the government can
tightly control the flow of information by citing national security concerns
and because the public must be even more vigilant to protect against
government abuses. The limitations on FOIA and the restrictions imposed
by the USA PATRIOT Act illustrate the shortcomings of the political
process at such a time.40 6 Therefore, a standard that both scrutinizes any
inflicted harm and assesses whether the government has opened the
information to the public, effectively determining whether government is
trying to control the content of the media, ensures the flow of information
without indiscriminately overturning established practices that allow both
the media and government to operate effectively.
406. See supra Part I.F.2.
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